Diplomarbeit

The Refugee Camp without Refugees?

Ein el-Sultan and its Socio-Spatial Fragmentation

ausgeführt zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Diplom-Ingenieurs
unter der Leitung von

Gesa Witthöft – Dr.-Ing. DI, Senior Scientist

Technische Universität Wien – Department für Raumplanung, Fachbereich Soziologie (E 280/6)

Eingereicht an der Technischen Universität Wien
Fakultät für Architektur und Raumplanung

von

David Kostenwein, MSc, BSc
0248257
Calle 37 #18A – 34
Bogotá, Colombia

TU WIEN
TECHNISCHE
UNIVERSITÄT
WIEN
Vienna University of Technology

Wien, am 25. Oktober 2014

KURZFASSUNG

Ein el-Sultan, ein palästinensisches Flüchtlingslager im Jordantal, Westjordanland, ist ein Ausnahmefall innerhalb der großen Ausnahme der palästinensischen Flüchtlingslager, ihrerseits die ältesten dieser Art auf der Welt. Flüchtlingslager in der Region sind geprägt von extrem dichten, informell gewachsenen urbanen Strukturen, mit starker Flüchtlingsmentalität, reichem sozialen Leben im gering verfügbaren öffentlichen Raum und einem intensiven politischen Diskurs.

Ein el-Sultan ist ein Ausnahmefall in vielerlei Hinsicht. Die räumliche Struktur ist geprägt von geringer Siedlungsdichte, Häusern mit Gärten, breiten, leeren Straßen und wenig Aktivität im öffentlichen Raum. Die soziale Organisation ist vergleichsweise wenig ausgeprägt, der politische Diskurs, so typisch in anderen Lagern, findet hier kaum statt. Aufgrund der besonderen Geschichte des Camps, auch bedingt durch die Lage im Jordantal nahe der Grenze zu Jordanien, sind die sozialen Strukturen sehr differenziert und fragmentiert. Neben den ursprünglichen Bewohnern, Flüchtlingen mehrheitlich aus Beduinenregionen, leben viele Mitglieder der palästinensischen politischen Elite im Camp. Darüber hinaus bauen immer mehr wohlhabende Familien aus Jerusalem oder Ramallah Ferienhäuser in Ein el-Sultan. Diese spezielle sozialräumliche Struktur hat auch Einfluss auf die Flüchtlingsidentität. Etwa ein Drittel der Bewohner sind nicht als Flüchtlinge registriert; viele sehen Ein el-Sultan nicht als Flüchtlingslager, sondern als *suburb* Jerichos.

Diese sozialräumlichen Umstände und das außergewöhnliche Selbstverständnis der Campbewohner markieren eine Sonderstellung unter palästinensischen Lagern, die nach 60 Jahren in einem Widerspruch zwischen temporärem und doch permanentem Status stecken. Entwicklung und Planung wird oft mit großer Kritik entgegengetreten, gilt doch jegliche Verbesserung der Lage als *Normalisierung*, als Gefährdung des temporären Charakters, der so wichtig ist für die Flüchtlingsidentität und den Anspruch auf Rückkehr (*Right of Return*).

Ein el-Sultan hat einen anderen Weg eingeschlagen, der Widerspruch zwischen Permanenz und Temporalität ist hier dabei, sich aufzulösen. Ein el-Sultan kann nun als wichtige Case-Study eines mehr oder weniger *normalisierten* Lagers verstanden werden.

Diese Arbeit versucht mithilfe des Forschungsansatzes der Grounded Theory und Methoden der Sozialraumanalyse, sozialräumliche Aspekte und Dynamiken in Ein el-Sultan zu verstehen und daraus folgend eine Grundlage zu schaffen, als relevanter Akteur besser auf diese Ausnahmesituation eingehen zu können. Die Arbeit stellt eine der wenigen sozialräumlichen Analysen von palästinensischen Flüchtlingslagern im Westjordanland dar

und betrachtet zum ersten Mal den Ausnahmefall Ein el-Sultan. Der Autor erachtet dies als wichtigen Schritt, um die Herausforderungen von Normalisierung im Kontext von ausgedehnten Flüchtlingssituationen und die Folgen für Governance in Camps besser verstehen zu können.

ABSTRACT

Ein el-Sultan, a Palestinian refugee camp in the Jordan Valley, West Bank, marks an exception within the exceptional character of Palestinian refugee camps, the oldest refugee camps in the world. Camps in the region are usually extremely dense, informally grown urban structures with a strong refugee identity, intense political discourse and an active social life in the scarcely available public space.

Ein el-Sultan is very different in many ways. The low density spatial structure is dominated by detached houses with large gardens, wide empty streets and vast underused public spaces. Social organisation is profoundly weaker compared to other camps, and the defining element of most camps in the region, the political discourse, is almost absent.

The social structure of Ein el-Sultan refugee camp is very fragmented, also due to its special historical development and its location close to the Jordanian border. Besides the original camp residents, mostly with Bedouin background, many members of the political elite have settled in the camp. Furthermore, wealthy Palestinians from Jerusalem or Ramallah are building holiday homes in the camp. This unique sociospatial structure has impacts on the refugee identity. Around a third of the camps population are not (registered) refugees and many don't see Ein el-Sultan as a refugee camp but as a suburb of Jericho.

These particular sociospatial circumstances and the self-understanding of the camp residents mark an exception among Palestinian refugee camps, which after more than 60 years of existence, are caught in a paradox situation between permanence and temporality. Generally, any improvement of the living condition is controversial, due to the fear of *normalisation*, a threat to the temporary status of the camps that is so important for the refugee camp identity and a guarantee for refugees' right to return to their original villages.

In Ein el-Sultan the question of permanence and temporality is dissolving. Ein el-Sultan can be understood as an important case study for a camp that is, to some extent, *normalised*.

The thesis analyses the sociospatial structure and dynamics of Ein el-Sultan using the research approach of grounded theory and the methodologies of sociospatial analysis in order to provide a starting point for a better

comprehension of this exceptional situation. This research is one of the few sociospatial analyses of camps in the West Bank and for the first time puts the spotlight on Ein el-Sultan. The author understands this research as an important step in order to better comprehend the challenges that come with processes of normalisation, consequence of protracted refugee situations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ERKLÄRUNG

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind als solche gekennzeichnet.

Die Arbeit wurde bisher in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht veröffentlicht.

Wien, am 25.10.2014

David Kostenwein, MSc., BSc.

Contents

LIST OF FIGURES

LANGUAGE

Many names of places and camps have different names in Arabic and English or have several translations from Arabic to English. This thesis is trying to use the most common English versions of locations, e.g. Jericho (Arabic: Ariha) and the official translations used by UNRWA for the refugee camps.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community Based Organisation
CIC	Campus in Camps
CIP	Camp Improvement Programme
CSO	Camp Service Officer
DORA	Department of Refugee Affairs
GIS	Geographic Information System
GIZ	German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
ICIP	Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNA	Palestinian National Authority (sometimes also PA)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugee in the Near East
WPC	Women Programme Centre

About this Thesis

This chapter introduces the context, relevance and scope of this research and presents the research questions and objectives. Moreover, this section explains the methodology used and briefly discusses relevant theoretical concepts.

Introduction

Palestinian refugee camps are the oldest camps in the world and have grown over the past 60 years in to complex urban and social structures. At the same time, they are caught in a unique paradox struggle, between temporariness and permanence. These refugee camps are in a status of political, social and spatial exception and any improvement of the living condition is controversial, due to the fear of *normalisation*, a threat to the temporary status of the camps that is so important for the refugee camps identity and a guarantee for the right to return to their original villages. Palestinian refugee camps are mostly dense, informally and incrementally grown urban structures with an immensely strong political identity and social organisation. They are symbols of a political struggle and the physical manifestation of the *nakhba* (the catastrophe) of 1948.

However, Ein el-Sultan refugee camp, located in the Jordan Valley near the town of Jericho, is an exception within these exceptional spaces. In contrast with other refugee camps in the West Bank, Ein el Sultan has a very low density, vast underused public spaces, large private gardens and a weaker political and social organisation.

The demographic structure of Ein el-Sultan is also particular and atypical for refugee camps in the West Bank. Around a third of the camps population are not (registered) refugees and many of them do not permanently live in the camp. Wealthy Palestinians from Jerusalem or Ramallah built holiday homes and only come to spend weekends or holidays in the camp due to its privileged climate and location in the Jordan Valley. Most of the non-refugees living in the camp though are PNA (Palestinian National Authority) returnees, who settled in Ein el-Sultan after years of exile in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords (1993). One resident says: "In *20 years Ein el-Sultan will be a refugee camp without refugees"*. As a consequence of the fluctuation not only in the number of inhabitants in the camp but their characteristics, social classes are very marked in Ein el-Sultan and social conflicts between the different social groups can be perceived. With the influx of PNA returnees, who had a more privileged social position, a higher class emerged in the camp and this has had an impact on the image, especially self-image, of Ein el-Sultan. With the negative perception refugee camps have for certain sectors of society, some refugees actually don't want to be perceived as residents of a refugee camp. One resident argued that Ein el Sultan is a "hotel", not a camp.

This research analyses the unique conditions that have led to the social and spatial fragmentation of Ein el-Sultan refugee camp and its relation with the spatial configuration of the camp. Ein el-Sultan refugee camp is an exception within Palestinian refugee camps but it also is an example of the outcomes of a prolonged refugee situation. The case of Ein el-Sultan raises important fundamental questions on the future of camps that could be of importance for the Palestinian refugee discourse in general.

CONTEXT, RELEVANCE AND SCOPE

With the increasing refugee population living in camps in the Middle East, understanding long term developments of camps in protracted situations is crucial. Michel Agier writes that the Palestinian Camp "*is the model on the horizon for research on present day camps*" (2011, S. 277). In this sense, Palestinian camps become important case studies for academia and practice alike.

This research on one specific Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank is one of the few sociospatial analyses done in this context[1]. The author of this document was part of the UNRWA Camp Improvement team working on a Camp Improvement Plan for Ein el-Sultan during 2013/2014. This one year participatory planning process that results in a spatial and social vision for the camp revealed the particular spatial and social situation of Ein el-Sultan among the Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank. Ein el-Sultan seemed to be the exception of many common characteristics of camps in the region.

The special social configuration marks a challenge for camp governance and provision of infrastructure and service especially for UNRWA. This thesis tries to investigate and understand the special aspects and dynamics that shape Ein el-Sultan in order to give some sort of orientation for a strategy on governance for relevant actors.

But even beyond that, these research intents to contribute to the ongoing discourse on Palestinian refugee camps and the challenges of temporality, identity and normalisation. Ein el-Sultan can be understood as an example of a camp that has undergone sociospatial processes that most of the other camps are trying to prevent with all force. In that sense Ein el-Sultan could be a useful case study to understand one possible future scenario of refugee camps in Palestine beyond temporality.

Even though grounded theories (the used research approach, see page 15) are not intending to act as large scale theories but rather as "*middle range theories*" (Altheit 1999, S. 16) with practical use, the research also tackles the urban discourse on a larger scale, namely questions of spatial structure and its influence on public space. This thesis, by studying Ein el-Sultan, is also providing an analysis of the influence of sociospatial structures on political and neighbourhood identity.

This document is not providing a holistic analysis of Ein el-Sultan but a short introduction in relevant aspects in order to be able to focus on certain sociospatial issues. The thesis also does not give a general introduction in the political, social and spatial context of Palestinian refugee camps but merely a short overview over relevant topics to this research.

---

[1] Good examples are the research project of UNRWA and the University of Stuttgart UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005 working with three refugee camps and the CIPs done by the UNRWA CIP team.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Question

It is a common process when conducting sociospatial research, not to rely on a static research question but to accept that the dynamics of the research process can influence the very nature of the research question. In that sense, the research question can act as a guiding element that helps orientation during complex research and helps to identify the research topic. In grounded theory, "*the research question becomes progressively focused throughout the research process. Alternatively, it can change altogether in the light of emerging categories*" (Willig 2013, S. 72). Besides that, grounded theory understands the research question as a first approach to a research topic, that is "*simply serving to identify the phenomenon we wish to study at the outset, the research question becomes progressively focused throughout the research process"* (Willig 2013, S. 72). Also Strauss and Corbin mention that "*grounded theory researchers need an initial research question to focus their attention upon the particular phenomenon they wish to investigate*" (1998, S. 37–40). According to them, it is important to use the research question only to identify the research phenomenon but not to make any assumptions about it or base it on existing theory (see Willig 2013, S. 72). This, in practice, is very hard to accomplish, especially in sociospatial research.

Throughout this investigation, the research questions changed several times, as they became more focused and specific, always facing the challenge of the need to formulate questions without assumptions that are independent from existing theory.

QUESTION 1: WHAT ARE THE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL AND SPATIAL FRAGMENTATION IN EIN EL-SULTAN REFUGEE CAMP?

This first research question breaks the principles mentioned by assuming that there is a particular social structure and spatial and social fragmentation in Ein el-Sultan, but this assumption is based on previous research of the author in the camp and has been affirmed during the research process for this thesis.

QUESTION 2: ARE THERE DYNAMICS OF SPATIAL EXPULSION IN EIN EL-SULTAN AND ARE THEY LINKED TO THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE?

This question initially referred to an existing theory, namely to gentrification. During the research process this term was dropped and

replaced by spatial expulsion[2], as the theory of gentrification did not seem to apply to this context.

QUESTION 3: IS THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND THE COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN EIN EL-SULTAN DIFFERENT FROM OTHER PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND WHAT ARE THE INFLUENCING FACTORS?

This research question assumes that there are influencing factors and it is also a YES/NO question, which usually should be prevented in grounded theory. Nevertheless the author felt that this formulation is appropriate, as it then evolves into an open question.

Objectives

OBJECTIVE 1: ANALYSE THE SOCIAL AND SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF EIN EL-SULTAN AND COMPARING THE RESULTS TO OTHER PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE WEST BANK.

This thesis studies Ein el-Sultan from a sociospatial perspective, using qualitative and quantitative methods of sociospatial research in order to understand the interrelation between the camps social and spatial processes and its physical structure.

OBJECTIVE 2: IDENTIFY SPECIFIC KEY CATEGORIES/ISSUES THAT ARE RELATED TO SOCIAL AND SPATIAL FRAGMENTATION AND CAMP IDENTITY.

According to the grounded theory approach an essential objective of this research is the identification of categories that describe common instances within the research phenomenon.

OBJECTIVE 3: UNDERSTAND AND POINT OUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE CATEGORIES/ISSUES.

Finally this research seeks to understand and describe the interrelation of the previously defined categories in order to create a theory on the research phenomenon.

---

[2] Translated from the German term: *räumliche Verdrängungsprozesse*

METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Relevant Concepts

As described on page 15, this thesis is mostly not built on existing theories or concepts. It chooses to use the grounded theory approach which to a certain extent prohibits the use of such elements. Nevertheless, it is important to briefly discuss related concepts in order to locate this research in the academic context and also to argue, why some concepts cannot be applied in this research context.

Spatial Segregation

Spatial Segregation is considered the spatial dimension of social inequality. It describes how social groups are not equally distributed over urban spaces as they are always concentrated and grouped in one way or another (Häußermann und Siebel 2001). "*Since there are cities, there is segregation*", write Häußerman and Siebel (ibid).

Social inequality has many dimensions, like income, ethnicity, gender, lifestyle and living standards (see Dangschat 2007, S. 26). The concept of spatial segregation addresses the impact these factors have on the choice of the location of residence or economic activity of individuals or households and the concentration or isolation of social groups. Causes for segregation can be legal, economic (land prices) or even individual or collective decisions, as the concept of assimilation of the Chicago School suggests. Other reasons might be fear of violence that produces enclaves of mostly wealthier groups.

Neither of these reasons, linked to a discourse regarding almost solely western cities, can fully explain the processes of segregation in Ein el-Sultan. The camp's spatial and social history as well as its particular political context has formed a unique causal history of spatial and social segregation. In this sense, this research uses a more general term, namely *social and spatial fragmentation*.

Social Milieus

In order to understand the social fragmentation of Ein el-Sultan, it is important find a suitable model to explain the social structure. The concept most usable in this context is the one of *social milieus*.

The concept of social milieus dates back to the 19th century and is deeply rooted in social sciences. In today's social research, social milieu refers mostly to groups of like-minded people with similar value systems,

principles of ways of life, relations to other humans and mentalities (see Hradil 2006). Smaller milieus, like for examples neighbourhoods often feature a strong internal cohesion. Also everyday behaviour can be defining ones milieu (ibid). Moreover, milieus are often defined by a similar historic background and a similar social and spatial environment (see Gally 2009, S. 10).

Milieus refer to social, cultural and economic life circumstances that are resulting in certain ways of subjective perception and appraisals that are forming individual actions and thoughts (see Fleischer 2008, S. 5).

This concept suits the situation and social structure in Ein el-Sultan much better than the more rigid and statistical social stratification, as the milieus in the camp are more fluid and vertical than the very horizontal strata. Milieus can easily cross different strata and are not bound to economic attributes. Milieus also usually are more deep and profound than the concept of lifestyles, which takes into account mostly behaviour patterns. While it is relatively easy to obtain a different lifestyle, a milieu is something one cannot easily change (see Hradil 2006).

The concept of social milieus is relevant and useful to understand the exceptional situation in Ein el-Sultan. Nevertheless, since the concept of milieu is strongly rooted in the western post-industrial discourse, this thesis will adapt the concept slightly and use the term *camp milieus* to refer to the different social entities in Ein el-Sultan.

Gentrification

Gentrification processes can be described as a shift in an urban community toward wealthier residents and businesses and increasing property values (see Lees 2000, S. 389–408). Marginalised social groups are driven out from spaces and places which they have legitimate social and historical claims (ibid). While processes like this might happen in Ein el-Sultan, most gentrification theory is based in the scenario of western city centres. While some examples have been described in informal settlements especially in Latin America, the spatial expulsion dynamics in Ein el-Sultan take their own form. One example is the real estate sector in Palestinian refugee camps that is officially non-existent and thus carries very particular attributes. The real estate market inside camps is a reality that is being ignored, for financial and political reasons, by all stakeholders including UNRWA and the Palestinian National Authorities for decades. Moreover there is a systematic disregard for the incremental physical development of the camp (see Taleb 2005). The inability of the humanitarian aid organizations or local authorities to acknowledge and regulate the evolution of camps from temporary emergency settlements to consolidated urban centres has been stated in

relevant literature (ibid). Because of this and other exceptional dynamics, Ein el-Sultans spatial expulsion processes need to be understood differently.

Why Grounded Theory?

Palestinian refugee camps are the oldest refugee camps existing today and just looking at e.g. the multifaceted real estate market[3] makes it clear that Palestinian refugee camps represent special urban contexts that are embedded in a complex political environment that does not resemble any other situation in the world. Therefore, researching sociospatial aspects in Palestinian refugee camps is a challenge as they mark very exceptional spaces with a unique history, social structure and complex and extraordinary governance structures. Although the spatial development and composition of refugee camps can and has been[4] compared to informal settlements in many aspects and therefore concepts of this context could be useful, the dynamics and causes for spatial and social fragmentation and spatial expulsion in informal settlements are very different to those found in Palestinian refugee camps.

In this exceptional context of Palestinian refugee camps, Ein el-Sultan marks another exception. This research focusses on how the camp´s special social composition relates to spatial and social fragmentation and camp identity. When approaching existing theoretical concepts of social/spatial segregation and gentrification, most of the theories are based on experiences on western cities and social contexts which do not fully apply to the reality of Ein el-Sultan.

Hence, the approach of grounded theory, a research style that puts a strong emphasis of generating new theories stemming out of social phenomena that are little known (see Altheit 1999, S. 5), seems to be an appropriate method to approach this particular context. Due to its inductive nature, it is a useful tool to approach "*areas that are relatively unknown by the researcher*" (Jones: Michael und Alony, S. 2). Grounded theory does not encourage deductive methods, like testing existing theories in the field. Grounded theory tries to avoid the use of "*external concepts that are brought to the data by the researcher*" (Willig 2013, S. 79).

The role of external theories in grounded theory is ambivalent. On the one hand, it is important, in the very nature of this approach, to not "r*ely on analytical constructs, categories or variables from pre-existing theories*". (Willig 2013, S. 69). Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that this should not

---

[3] See the excellent introduction to real estate in Palestinian refugee camps by Adwan Taleb (Taleb 2005 2005)
[4] E.g. these two theses are comparing Palestinian refugee camps with informal settlements in Latin America: Sanjines 2013 and Dias, Amanda S A 2013

lead to ignoring existing contextual knowledge as "*contextual knowledge increases the ability to create theory*" (Ruge 2009, S. 17). Strauss, one of the founders of the theory, himself argues that good contextual knowledge improves the sensibility of the researcher when collecting data and forming a theory (see 2004, S. 440). Therefore, some theoretical concepts in contexts of the research phenomenon have been consulted and shortly introduced.

In the following section, grounded theory is shortly introduced and explained. This section does not aim to act as a general introduction to grounded theory but solely wants to provide the reader with a basic understanding of this research approach.

Definition, history and rationale

Grounded Theory was developed in the 1960ies by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss as a radical new inductive approach towards sociological research. They basically turned around common research practise that starts with hypotheses and tests existing theories in the field. Grounded theory intents to start the research process with open data collection that through various steps becomes a new and truly grounded theory. This movement from data to theory is the fundamental principle of this research approach. The aim was to support the creation of specific theories that would not be derived from existing concepts (see Willig 2013).

Grounded theories can be understood on the one hand as the result of a research process, a theory that is *grounded*, and on the other hand as a research approach. Grounded theory as the product "*provides us with an explanatory framework with which to understand the phenomenon under investigation*" (Willig 2013, S. 70).

It is important to understand that grounded theory is not a set of specific research methods but rather a research style, framework or guideline. Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin define grounded theory as follows (Ruge 2009, S. 4): *„The grounded theory approach is a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon".* The term *method* has to be understood as a general method, not as specific research methods (e.g. interviews). In this sense, "*Grounded theory as method provides us with guidelines on how to identify categories, how to make links between categories and how to establish relationships between them*" (Willig 2013, S. 70)

Glaser and Strauss later developed their own branches of grounded theory, resulting in two opposing understandings of the original idea. While there are many differences, the main disagreements are located in the

understanding of the use of existing knowledge (Jones: Michael und Alony, S. 5):

"[...] Glaser takes the stance that researchers should have an empty mind, while Strauss permits a general idea of the area under study. Glaser leads with the principle that theory should emerge, while Strauss uses structured questions to lead a more forced emergence of theory."

Research process

Grounded theory is made up of several research steps that in the end result in a contextual, grounded theory. Not all of these steps, but only the most fundamental ones, are mentioned here.

Categories and Coding

The first and maybe defining step of the grounded theory approach is *coding.* During coding, the researcher develops analytic *categories of meaning* through open data collection and analysis. Categories are grouped incidences or meanings ("*occurrences, processes, events*") that "*share central features or characteristics with one another*" (Willig 2013, S. 70), that are rooted in the phenomena and not in pre-existing concepts. . They are not pre-defined but evolve, merge and change over the coding process, which marks a fierce difference to other research methods. These categories can be descriptive but should become more abstract during the ongoing research.

Comparative Analysis and Negative Case analysis

Throughout the constantly changing analytical categories, certain tools help to develop a consistent theory. Through *comparative analysis,* the researcher compares the emerging categories and creates relations between them (e.g. sub categories) and adjusts them if needed. *Negative case analysis* is a tool used to analyse cases that do not fit in the developed category system in order to provide depth and complexity to the theory.

Development of Theory

After having completed the development of theory, ideally after a theoretic saturation has appeared, the analysis of the relations between the categories forms the grounded theory. A theory in this case is a "*complex network of relations of terms and groups of terms*" (Dilger 2000), in our case categories.

Grounded theories are not aiming to develop general large theories but contextual middle range theories that can be of use in a practical sense (Altheit 1999, S. 16).

This research follows the general design of a research process suggested by the grounded theory. Regarding existing knowledge the understanding of Glaser, has been used in the case of this thesis, as existing theories were to a certain extent the starting point of this research.

Coding and the development of categories happened throughout almost a year, with more than six months of actual data collection in the field. The development of a theory was the most challenging part as new research questions emerged during the research process.

The methods for data collection were various methods mostly from the field of social-spatial research and are described below.

Socio-spatial Research

As mentioned above, grounded theory does not impose or suggest a set of research tools or methods but rather defines the research process or a research style. Nevertheless, many grounded theory studies use methods and data sources like interviews, group interviews, statistics, newspaper articles, questionnaires, diaries, letters and alike. As this research focuses on socio-spatial aspects it makes sense to use methods of socio-spatial analysis and apply them within the framework of grounded theory. Using these methodologies in the context of a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank has not been done many times before[5].

Sociospatial analysis roots in urban sociology and is linking space with social action or behaviour. It regards space as socially constructed rather than a geographically defined area (see Hofinger 2014). The following levels of the social space play an important role for this concept (Löw 2001; Läpple 1991; Sturm 2000): social action (uses, social interaction, purpose of space, social conflicts,...), material features (urban design and user perception), cultural expression (image and symbolic meaning of spaces, larger relation and narration of spaces), regulation (planning regulations, planning process, power relations).

Common research methods used in socio-spatial analysis are (Hertzsch 2014): analysis of primary data, GIS analysis, questionnaires, participant observations, *Stadtspaziergänge*[6], mental mapping, photo and film analysis, expert and group interviews, focus groups.

---

[5] a good example of such a study in four other camps in the West Bank is the one conducted by UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005
[6] English: strollology

This study is aiming to combine various methods of sociospatial analysis and to adjust them to the specific context. The research is also trying to create a new methodology of interviews in which the role of the interviewer and interviewee are blurred and interwoven (see below).

Research Methods

GIS analysis

In order to comprehend the particular spatial arrangement of Ein el-Sultan rooted in the specific historical and political development of the camp, a GIS based analysis of land use, built up areas, private and public areas, street hierarchy and regional context was conducted.

Analysis of historical maps and data

The historical development of Ein el-Sultan, because of its strategic location in the Jordan Valley, the historical importance of this site, and its border with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, has made this an important camp over the decades. This historical evolution seems to have strong influence on the socio-spatial attributes of Ein el-Sultan today and its relationship with the city of Jericho. Hence, the scarcely available historic data and the few historical maps were analyses.

Focus Groups

The focus group methodology has its roots in the first half of the 20th century in the context of market and consumer research. Later it was often used in the health sector and qualitative social research. The methodology aims at capitalising on "*communication between research participants in order to generate data*" (Kitzinger 1995). In contrast to group interviews, the focus group methodology "*explicitly use group interaction as part of the method*" (ibid). In the exchange between the participants lies the central interest of the researcher instead of a strict question answer process. The researcher takes the role as a moderator and often uses a semi structured guideline to steer the discussions.

At UNRWA, "*Focus Group sessions are a key tool to ensure a broad and inclusive community participation in camp improvement (…) In Focus Group sessions, the articulation of emotional responses, desires, fears, specific suggestions and so forth are all welcome as they offer invaluable insights into how ordinary residents perceive everyday life in the camp*" (UNRWA ICIP 2008, S. 71)

The researcher conducted, and had access to transcripts, of several focus groups with all social groups of the camp undertaken by UNRWA Camp Improvement during 2013-2014. They cover topics regarding space and social structure, camp identity, past and future development as well as a qualitative needs assessment. Analysing this material was helpful to understand the different narratives and perspectives of different social milieus in Ein el-Sultan.

Activating Workshops

These activating workshops followed the ideas of the methodology of activating *community diagnosis*. This method rooted in urban psychology is a semi-standardised qualitative process that builds on a participative approach to urban diagnosis (Ehmayer 2014).

UNRWA alters this methodology slightly and shifts the focus from diagnosis to creating a vision: "*Instead of specific solutions to specific problems, comprehensive planning is the development of a comprehensive vision setting the goals and targets for camp improvement for all the main aspects of communal life over the next years to come*" (UNRWA ICIP 2008, S. 122).

The author of this research, as part of the UNRWA Camp Improvement team, conducted five activating workshops on topics like *common space*, *infrastructure* and *cultural development*. The transcripts of these workshops were analysed and used to build a theory as described above.

Stakeholder Analysis

The stakeholder analysis is mostly used in the context of political science and in the development aid sector. The stakeholder analysis uses similar open research processes like grounded theory (see Legewie 2009). This method tries to investigate, which persons, groups, institutions, organisations and alike are impacting a certain project or research or are likely to be impacted by the latter.

In order to understand the social and political structure of the camp, a stakeholder analysis was necessary. Especially when it comes to governance, comprehending actors in the camp is essential. This analysis covered camp institutions, camp milieus, political actors and regional and national stakeholders playing a strong role in the camp.

Expert Interviews

The expert interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format. Experts in this sense refer to people with particular knowledge in the relevant context, meaning not only academics or professionals are seen as experts.

Several interviews with experts working in and with the camp were conducted in an initial step to grasp the general social and spatial structure of Ein el-Sultan. Experts interviewed are urban planners and architects from UNRWA and GIZ as well as participants of the project Campus in Camps (see below).

Semi Structured Dialogue Driven Interviews

As mentioned above, this research is trying to create a new approach in conducting interviews. The general methodology used is the one of semi structured interviews. In contrast to structured interviews, semi-structured interviews leave space for the interview to take unexpected turns and to bring in new ideas. Nevertheless, there is a rough structure and questions prepared in order to provide the needed results within a certain framework. This method is not to be confused with open interview formats where no structure is followed.

Throughout this process the researcher faced obstacles conducting interviews in a foreign language and cultural context that could hinder the methodology. Instead of working with regular translators, the author chose to cooperate with refugee participants of Campus in Camps (CIC), the first university inside a refugee camp.

CIC is an experimental education platform that works with refugees from four different camps in the southern West Bank. It is aiming to create a new discourse *with* and not *about* refugees. Therefore a group of young refugees together with local and international academics rethink common concepts like *refugeehood*, *right of return* and *refugee camp* in a two year long process of debate and academic research. The outcome of this exceptional project is the generation of a new discourse constructed by the young empowered refugees themselves[7]. One main characteristic about this program is recognising refugees as experts of their own built environment and therefore with agency to improve their living conditions.

This research had the privilege of counting with the participation of CIC participants who cooperated in conducting the interviews in Ein el-Sultan. The fact that the interviewers are refugees themselves, living in refugee camps and have undergone an extensive intellectual process of questioning

---

[7] Read about the project here: www.campusincamps.ps

the discourse around refugeehood immensely enriched this research. The way they are able to understand, question and connect to the issues perceived and raised by the residents of Ein el-Sultan was an important contribution to the research process. They created an intimate atmosphere as the interviewees in Ein el-Sultan felt understood and comfortable talking to another refugee. At the same time, the Campus in Camp participants brought an external perspective to Ein el-Sultan as they are from very different camps. They were able to challenge and in a way incite the interviewees as they have learned in the CIC project which turned out to be very fruitful and productive and would not have been possible in traditional interview scenarios. In this sense the interview changed from a one sided methodology, where only the answers are the matter of interest, to a two sided methodology, a dialogue, where both, question and answer, contribute to the research.

In the second step, the researcher interviewed the CIC participants themselves several times based on the interview transcripts from Ein el-Sultan and discussed the outcomes with them. This process added a lot of perspectives and depth to the conducted interviews as the participants offered new relevant aspects and questions that helped in future research and also changed the coming interviews in Ein el-Sultan.

This approach takes into account the interpretative role of a researcher in grounded theory. Data is not supposed to be just recorded but have to be commented and challenged. Grounded theory talks about *theoretic sensibility* (than can stem out of professional, academic or personal experience alike) , the ability to identify important and less important parts in data (see Dilger 200). For social constructionists, the researcher in grounded theory "*is more than a witness; (s)he actively constructs a particular understanding of the phenomenon under investigation*" (Willig 2013, S. 80).

These dialogue driven semi-structured interviews mark the backbone of the research. Around ten interviews with most[8] camp milieus in the camps were conducted. Some of them were individual, some group interviews.

---

[8] It was not possible to reach Jerusalemite holiday makers throughout the research process.

FIGURE 1: INTERVIEWS IN EIN EL-SULTAN, SOURCE: TAKEN BY THE AUTHOR

Mental Maps

Along with the interviews, the researcher used the mental maps methodology in order to link findings on the social structure with space. This has proven to be challenging, as the camp residents found it hard to work with a map, but contributed to the information gathered in the verbal interviews.

FIGURE 2: MENTAL MAPS, SOURCE: TAKEN BY THE AUTHOR

Thoughts on the researcher's position:

As mentioned above, the researcher was involved in the UNRWA Camp Improvement Programme for Ein el-Sultan for almost a year and has been present in the camp on various occasions, like workshops, presentations or cultural events. He was then clearly perceived by the camp community as an UNRWA employee and therefore took the role of an external donor with a certain power. This role might jeopardize the research and its objectivity and neutrality. The researcher was aware of this danger and was always trying to emphasize and clarify his new role as an independent researcher to the camp residents. The presence of the CIC participants has clearly helped in avoiding a confusion of roles.

On the other hand, the personal professional history of the author in Ein el-Sultan, not only has allowed the researcher to visit and study the camp during an extended period of time, but also enabled him to access data and documents that would not be available otherwise as well as contact relevant stakeholders and actors in the camp.

THE CONTEXT OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS

This section gives a short overview over the status, history, politics, social and spatial structure and governance of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank. This chapter is not a comprehensive introduction to these refugee camps but solely provides basic information in order to understand the complex context of Ein el-Sultan refugee camp[9].

REFUGEE CAMPS AND THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT

With a refugee population that is growing globally, in the year 2013 more than 40 million people were either refugees or internally displaced (UNHCR

---

[9] For a comprehensive and thorough diagnosis of Palestine refugee camps in the West Bank, refer to: UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005

2014), the model of refugee camps is more than relevant than ever. Even though refugee camps are generally seen as the last resort and the worst option of sheltering displaced people, the number of camps is rising, also due to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

The discourse around refugee camps is vivid and urban planners, engineers, architects and alike are searching for more sustainable approaches in order to create better ways of dealing with great numbers of refugees.

Refugee camps are generally understood as grouped and planned forms of shelters for displaced people. There are many forms of refugee camps rooted in different forms of organisation, localisation and social and political context. UNHCR differentiates two kinds of refugee camps, namely *spontaneous* and *planned* camps (Sanjines 2013, S. 11–12).

This thesis deals with very specific refugee camps, which Michel Agier calls a "*traditional refugee camp*" (Agier, S. 37). These more planned and standardized camps take a very official form. (see ibid, p. 37). UNHCR describes these more traditional planned camps as places "*where refugees are accommodated in purpose-built sites where a full range of services, within possible means, are provided"* (Sanjines 2013, S. 11–12).

Palestinian refugee camps are most likely the oldest refugee camps existing with a history of more than 60 years. Their unique development and exceptional history make them important camps to study in order to understand consequences of protracted crisis (see ibid, p. 8).

UNRWA, the agency responsible for Palestinian refugee camps, defines them as "*a plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to cater to their needs. Areas not designated as such and are not recognized as camps. However, UNRWA also maintains schools, health centres and distribution centres in areas outside the recognized camps where Palestine refugees are concentrated, such as Yarmouk, near Damascus.*

The plots of land on which the recognized camps were set up are either state land or, in most cases, land leased by the host government from local landowners. This means that the refugees in camps do not 'own' the land on which their shelters were built, but have the right to 'use' the land for a residence" (UNRWA 2014).

This thesis analyses a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank. Therefore, this short introduction to Palestinian refugee camps will focus on camps in the West Bank. It is important to notice that the situation of Palestinian refugees and Palestinian refugee camps in other countries or regions (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza) can be very different.

History and Spatial Development

Palestinian refugee camps were the result of the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 when more than 700.000 Palestinian refugees were in need for shelter in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza as they have lost their homes during the conflict.

In the case of the West Bank, "*refugees began settling in areas close to existing cities, connected to main roads, close to water sources or simply next to an urban center [...] The process of settlement took 10 years from initial displacement to the actual formation of camps and the role of the Red Cross in these initial stages was more reactive than proactive, distributing tents without any specific plan*" (Sanjines 2013, S. 16).

FIGURE 3: DHEHEISHE REFUGEE CAMP 1950. THIS IMAGE CAPTURES THE TENTS SUPPLIED BY THE RED CROSS AND THE FIRST CONCRETE SHELTERS SUPPLIED BY UNRWA. HISTORIC PHOTO: BRAVE NEW ALPS IMAGE, SOURCE: CAMPUS IN CAMPS

While in the first years, refugee camps were built in a mostly unplanned, informal manner with tents and later self-built structures, often resembling spatial structures of the original villages, the structures became more planned and formal when UNRWA took over from the Red Cross a few years later (see ibid). In the 1950ies, UNRWA provided the refugees with standardised shelters and constructed infrastructure to provide basic services, like health and sanitation. UNRWA attempted to implement standardized camp planning models which consisted in the imposition of a grid structure and specific zoning (see UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 75). Daniela Sanjines writes that "*UNRWA's camp planning strategies seemed to disregard any existing social and spatial dynamics*" (Sanjines 2013, S. 16).

The war of 1967 that brought Israeli occupation in the West Bank had stark consequences on Palestinian refugee camps and new camps outside the West Bank were established. Many camp residents of West Bank camps fled to the neighbouring countries, leaving many empty plots behind. This made extension of existing shelter possible and as the economic situation of the remaining refugees in the West Bank increased due to improved employment opportunities during this time. Daniela Sanjines calls this period the time of "*horizontal consolidation*" (see 2013, S. 19).

During the first intifada, camps grew informally and mostly vertically. This marked the beginning of the period of "*vertical expansion*" (ibid). This informal growth was rooted in demographic growth, limited spatial resources and the inability to construct outside the camp for many refugees. UNRWA was not able to control this vertical growth that resulted in severe structural risks: "*The years of the first intifada marked a radical turning point in the lives of Palestinian refugees [resulting in a] diminishing of UNRWA's control over informal construction inside the camps.*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 78).

FIGURE 6: THE VERTICAL EXPANSION OF SHELTERS IN AMARI CAMP. SOURCE: UNRWA UND SIAAL UNIVERSITY OF STUTTGART 2005, S. 175

The end of the first intifada and the Oslo Accord of 1993 brought more demographic growth to Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank,

29

catalysed the vertical expansion process and made way for increased land market processes within the camps with a thriving but informal real estate sector. The question of demographic growth within rigid camp borders is a challenge until today. Many camps in the region have spilled over and in the case of Dheheishe camp in Bethlehem even created new towns next to the original camp.

In summary, Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank have undergone a complex spatial development and have been shaped by exceptional historical events. They have changed strongly over the last 60 years from unplanned tent settlements to consolidated dense urban areas today, where the camp borders "*are often no longer visible*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005). These 60 year old refugee camps are sometimes referred to as camp cities (Camp Villes), "*urban centers maintained in an informal and precarious state*" (Agier, S. 37). Camps are mostly heavily urbanised and feature very dense structures and suffer from overpopulation and weak infrastructure. Today, roughly 165.000 people are living in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 19), 1.5 million in all 58 Palestinian refugee camps in the whole Middle East (UNRWA 2014).

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

After more than 60 years of existence, Palestinian refugee camps have
evolved into socially and politically complex entities. Especially camps in the
West Bank are in a paradox situation of being embedded in a society of
Palestinians and there are less problems of integration in the surrounding
life than for example in Lebanon.

Refugees in the West Bank "*have an ambiguous status in West Bank society*
[and] *they are firmly built into the national struggle against the Israeli
occupation and are valued as human reminders of historical injustice and the
abuse of human rights*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S.
281). Refugee camps are therefore physical and visible as well as symbolical
manifestation of the political struggle and especially the right to return (see
below). Their very exceptional status and history makes them "*an entity that
carries with it the weight of the history of the Palestinian exodus and
resistance, and it is very difficult to pretend that it is just another normal
space*" (Hanafi 2010, S. 20). Michel Agier writes that "*the camps pay a heavy
tribute to the Palestinian cause*" (2011, S. 278). On the other hand "*camp
residents are still looked on as outsiders, sometimes even intruders. In a society
where place of origin, family, and property assets are still of the greatest*

importance, refugees are automatically positioned at the margins" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 281).

Manuel Herz argues that in general, *"refugee camps are probably the most direct translation of politics into space […] The camp is an instance of politics directly translated into space"* (Herz 2012). Palestinian refugee camps at least in the West Bank are almost by definition political spaces. Sandi Hilal argues that refugee camps are the headquarters of the Palestinian refugee discourse (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). They would have stopped to exist a long time ago and dissolved in their environment, if their political discourse and struggle would not have been their defining element. Or, in Hilals words: "*A camp is a camp because of politics*" (ibid).

Two of the defining elements of the political identity in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank are the concepts of normalisation and the right to return. As they are crucial to understand the political and social as well as the spatial structure of the camps, they will be shortly introduced in the following section.

Normalisation and the Right to Return

The right to return is a complex issue that cannot be understood as just a physical return to the original villages or houses of Palestinians who fled their homes decades ago. However, traditionally, it is clearly rooted in an actual *return*, as the right of return "*relates to the non-binding UN General Assembly Resolution 194 passed on December 11, 1948, which recommended that the Palestinian and Jewish refugees should be permitted to return [to areas from which they were displaced] […] the text of its Article 11 resolves ´that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property…´*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005).

The struggle for the right to return is intrinsic in the refugee culture. The key to the lost homes is one of the main symbols found in refugee camps and many refugees are wearing their key on a necklace as a reminder of their struggle. While the *home* is a concept that is clear for the first generation of refugees, who actually left their homes, for the younger refugees who were born in camps, the concepts of *home* and hence also the right to return have changed. A return to houses or villages they have never visited or that in most cases don't exist anymore has lost its simple physical dimension of

returning. The right to return becomes a more symbolical but also wider concept of e.g. freedom of movement[10].

The concept of normalisation is present in the Palestinian discourse in general and takes many forms. In short, this discourse warns from any actions that normalise the exceptional status of the occupation in Palestine. A common definition that was agreed on during a conference in Ramallah in 2007 is:

 "Normalisation means to participate in any project or initiative or activity, local or international, specifically designed for gathering (either directly or indirectly) Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis, whether individuals or institutions; that does not explicitly aim to expose and resist the occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian people." (Odeh Kassis 2011).

For refugees and refugee camps in particular, normalisation has a very different dimension that is more pragmatic and strongly linked to the right of return. The fight against normalisation is rooted in the rationale, that the status of refugee camps ensures the temporariness of their stay away from their original homes. Would they accept integration into e.g. ta Palestinian state, they would give up their refugee status and their official right to return. Normalisation in that sense might *"weaken the camp's symbolic status, or worse, lead to the loss of possible compensation or future re-claiming of ancestral properties"* (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 227). The struggle for keeping the exceptional temporary status poses many problems regarding Palestinian refugee camps.

The question of temporariness versus permanence is central when talking about normalisation of Palestinian refugee camps. There usually is "*a strong will of the community to not accept their situation as a permanent one as this immediately implies giving up on the right of return"* (Sanjines 2013, S. 14). At the same time there is the need to improve living conditions, as the camps exist since decades and are de facto permanent.

Actually, the act of building (self-built) permanent walls and a roof in the first months of the camps 60 years ago was a painful symbolic process that went along with the acceptance of a more permanent displacement. When UNRWA provided improved shelter units in the 1950, many refugees were reluctant to use them as "*the act of keeping the old shelter then becomes an act of resisting ´normalisation´ of an exceptional condition"* (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 71).

---

[10] For interesting discussions around new ways of understanding the right to return, visit: www.decolonizing.ps or www.campusincamps.ps

This paradox scenario marks a big challenge for the refugees themselves as well as for other actors, like UNRWA. Attempts to improve the living condition is the camps are not always welcome as *"refugees living in the camps themselves believe to an extent that it is important to perpetuate the camps' appearance as temporary, make-shift, and seemingly chaotic places, and that this is connected to ensuring the Right of Return"* (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 227). Projects that improved infrastructure, houses or even social infrastructure were often looked at with criticism: *"For years refugees have been reluctant to improve or build in the camp because there is a fear that this will lead to ta'tbih [Arabic for Normalisation] and more importantly that by challenging the international image of refugees as victims living in poverty awaiting aid, will divert their attention to the Palestinian cause"* (Sanjines 2013, S. 46).

The fear of normalisation is still very present in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank today. Albeit attempts to find compromises in order to be able to improve the living conditions without diminishing the temporary status and the right to return have been successful and investment and improvements in camps are nowadays more acceptable and even desired by the refugees[11]. Michel Agier describes the widening gap in Palestinian camps *"between the theoretical "camp" as a spatial exception and legal and political waiting zone, on the one hand, and the continually changing urban and social realities of the Palestinian camps, on the other"* (2011, S. 278).

GOVERNANCE

The ambiguous status of Palestinian refugee camps already suggests that governance in camps might be a complicated issue with no clear defined responsibilities. In the context of refugee camps in the West Bank, *"governance refers to how a camp is managed in terms of its relationship with the legal authorities and local municipalities of the host country, as well as the internal relationships between the groups within the camps, especially regarding conflict resolution for everyday problems. Modes of governance, therefore, are not about political representation of the Palestinian people or camp dwellers, but rather about the administrative representation"* (Hanafi 2010, S. 5).

In Palestinian refugee camps in other countries, governance has a very different character and the host governments of e.g. Jordan or Lebanon play a very strong role. In the West Bank, governance structures have become more complex over time and pose many challenges today with blurred

---

[11] *"According to the 2003 survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR),43 half of the refugees surveyed […] would accept radical improvements to their camp"* (Hanafi 2010, S. 17)

borders of administrative responsibilities and a lack of democratically elected representation. The fact that the host government on the West Bank (and in Gaza) is to a certain extent[12] Palestinian run does not make things easier or clearer in terms of governance. Misselwitz and Hanafi argue that the camps are made up of "*a tapestry of multiple, partial sovereignties. This includes real sovereign bodies like the Lebanese government or the PLO/PA and a patchwork of actors who contribute to the governance of the camp*" (2009). The structure of governance in these refugee camps is exceptional and unique. Agier writes that "*camps gradually become the sites of an enduring organization of space, social life and system of power that exist nowhere else*" (2002, S. 322). The overlapping of responsibilities without clear structures leads to void of governance and neither the camp residents, nor the organisations often have clarity over who is in charge (see Sanjines 2013, S. 78).

The following section introduces main actors in the governance of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank. These main actors are: PNA, DORA (Popular Committee), Political Parties (Fatah, Hamas...), UNRWA and Notables.

A more detailed and specific analysis for the case of Ein el-Sultan is provided at page 50.

Palestinian National Authority (PNA)

The host government in the West Bank, at least in Areas A[13] and to a certain extent Area B is the PNA, a Palestinian run entity. Nevertheless, the relations between the PNA and the refugee camps are not without friction. Sandi Hilal argues that the sole existence of refugee camps in the West Bank is a threat to the PNA, because the struggle for the right to return endangers the desired two state-solutions based on 1967 borders. Without this issue being solved, a compromise with Israel is hard to reach (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). It is not surprising that the PNA has ambivalent attitudes toward the camps:

"*The PNA's position toward this issue is very complex. While the PNA has developed some projects for the camps, the camps are still conceived as enclaves under the responsibility of the international community and in*

---

[12] Some refugee camps in the West Bank are located in Area B with strong control of the Israeli Administration (see page 34).

[13] In 1995, the Oslo II Accords defined distinctive Areas in the West Bank with different grades of Palestinian self-governance: Area A is under complete Palestinian administration and marks for around 3% of the West Bank territory, mainly the main Palestinian cities; Area B is under civil Palestinian administration but under joint Palestinian and Israeli security control, this area accounts for roughly a quarter of the West Bank; Area C is under full control of Israel, including main roads, Israeli settlements, national parks and military areas, this area accounts for around 74% of the West Bank total area.

particular, of UNRWA. In fact, the PNA reinforced the division of space into refugee and non-refugee areas by excluding the camps from urban or infrastructural projects. For instance, the recent committee that supervises the work on the master plan issued in 2001 for three municipalities (Bireh, Ramallah, and Bitonia) ended up without any representative from the three refugee camps located in the area" (Hanafi 2010, S. 20).

The results are spatial development plans with blank areas where refugee camps are located. This is a perfect example for the problems of integration of the camps in the administrative responsibilities of PNA. The standing of the organisation among camp residents is ambivalent. On the one hand, the somewhat opposing political agendas of refugees in camps and the PNA results in mistrust, on the other hand there is a certain appreciation, as the PNA does, to a certain extent, invest in camps and some important positions within the organisation are held by refugees from camps.

Department of Refugee Affairs (DORA)

DORA is strongly linked to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLA) and the PNA. It was founded in 1996 to as an organisation dealing with issues regarding Palestinian refugees with *"two primary functions [centred] around the implementation of laws and resolutions issued by the Palestinian National Council (PNC), and the implementation of refugee rights and their right of return"* (Hanafi 2010, S. 9, 2010).

DORA finds it hard to compete in the complex power structures of camps and on the ground acts more as a connection between the camp and the PNA. Hanafi calls the role of DORA in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank the *"leading authority"* (2010). On the ground, DORA has some influence due to their links with the Popular Committees.

Popular Committee

Popular Committees (sometimes called Local Committee) root in committees formed by important camp residents after the Oslo Accord. There are certain financial and organisational links with the DORA and the PNA. They are *"the equivalent of municipal administrations and are, among other things, responsible for the water and electricity supply, garbage collection, for the settling of conflicts between camp residents, and for dealing with external authorities"* (Hanafi 2010, S. 10). The members of these committees are usually important figures and are not democratically elected but appointed. Together with DORA, the Popular Committees can be seen as, at least officially, most notable actors in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)

UNRWA represents the humanitarian sector and the international community in the Palestinian refugee camps. UNRWA was founded after the crisis of 1948 "*as a refugee organization specifically dedicated to the Palestinian refugees. Its UN mandate included catering for the basic needs of refugees [...]*" (Hanafi 2010, S. 15). In camps, UNRWA provides services like health, education and social programmes, like microcredit schemes. The organisation plays an important role in the camps, even though it insists on not being the administrator of the camps but rather just a service provider. Nevertheless, *"UNRWA's role is crucial to the social and economic support and relief activities, through its programs running in the camp, and through its bodies such as: the Camp Service Office and the Women Program Centres (WPC)"* (Hanafi 2010, S. 16).

Next to the head of the Popular Committee, the Camp Service Officer, the head of UNRWA operations on the camp level, mark| the most important officials in the camps. Hanafi calls UNRWA the "Phantom Authority" (ibid).

Recently UNRWA has also become a major voice and lobby for refugee's rights in the international discourse.

UNRWA´s role is also a symbolic one as its presence is often seen as *"guaranteeing the "temporary" purpose of the camps as well as providing much needed services and poverty relief"* (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005)

Notables (Mokhtar)

A less formal but very significant role in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank play local notables (Mokhtar), who play a crucial role in customary law and conflict resolution. They have played important roles in camp management over years and are often consulted by other actors, like e.g. UNRWA.

Political Parties

Several political parties are influential factors in camp politics. Most of them are linked to Fatah or Islamic conservative parties like Hamas. Formally, these parties are often represented in the Popular Committee.

Ein el-Sultan Refugee Camp

This chapter presents a sociospatial analysis of Ein el-Sultan refugee camp. It provides a historic overview as well as a stakeholder analysis. Furthermore, it features an economic, demographic and urban analysis of the camp and finally compares Ein el-Sultan to other camps in the region.

Basic Information

Ein el-Sultan is a Palestinian refugee camp with the geopolitical status of Area A. It has approximately 870 dunums (87 hectares). Around 2.000 to 3.000 refugees and non-refugees live within the borders of the camp.

Location and Regional Context

Ein el-Sultan is located in the Jordan Valley, 2.5 km north from the city centre of Jericho. Jericho is only few kilometres away from the Jordan River

and the border to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and acts as border city for all Palestinians crossing to Jordan[14]. Amman and Jerusalem can be reached in less than an hour by car from Jericho (disregarding the border or checkpoints). Jericho is the regional centre of the Jordan Valley in the West Bank.

FIGURE 9; EIN EL-SULTAN IN THE WEST BANK. SOURCE: FASTTIMESINPALESTINE 2014

---

[14] The PNA has its border control in Jericho as the border itself is controlled by Israel. Basically all Palestinian travelling abroad go through Jericho since this is the only border crossing they can use.

Ein el-Sultan lies on the hills west of the city, right next to Tell es-Sultan, the ancient site of the so called oldest city on earth. The biblical site of the mount of temptation and the touristic cable car leading there are directly overlooking the camp. Therefore Ein el-Sultan is embedded in major touristic sites in there are numerous hotels and resorts close by. Ein el-Sultan can be reached by the main road leading to the Northern Jordan Valley and by the road linking Jericho with important cities in the Northern West Bank, such as Ramallah and Nablus. Therefore Ein el-Sultan is well connected to the local and regional road network.

Ein el-Sultan lies within Jericho Governorate and borders An Nu'eima village to the north and Ad Duyuk village to the west. Ein el-Sultan is located at an altitude of 198m below sea level[16] with a mean annual rainfall of 146.6mm and an average temperature of 24 degrees Celsius (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 4).

---

15 Area A, B and C refer to the administrative division after the Oslo Accords (see footnote page 33)
[16] Ein el-Sultan is together with Aqbat Jabr probably the lowest refugee camp on earth.

Photo Essay[17]

HISTORY

Obtaining historical data of Palestinian refugee camps is challenging and resources are scarce. Due to its indistinct status of governance, it is not clear which entity is responsible for keeping records and collecting data. Many refugee camps were founded and administered by different organisations over time and in the case of the West Bank, even the host government has changed several times, as the West Bank was governed by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Israel and the PNA in the period after 1948. Hence collecting data and other historical material, like maps, is very complicated. Some camps in the region have undergone some historical research, but Ein el-Sultan has not yet been deeply studied (to the knowledge of the author). The main resource of data for Ein el-Sultan is UNRWA and in particular the information provided by the UNRWA CIP Team. In the following paragraphs, a historical overview of the major developments will be presented but it has to mentioned that this is not an in depth historical analysis of Ein el-Sultan, which would be out of the scope of this document.

Ein el-Sultan is located in a historically highly significant area. Adjacent to the camp lays Tell el-Sultan, an archaeological site of major significance often referred to as remains of the oldest urban settlement in the world. It is the same spring that gave its name to this archaeological site that Ein el-Sultan derives its name from.

The camp was established as most Palestinian refugee camps in 1948 following the foundation of the state of Israel and the Arab-Israeli war (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 5). The proximity to the border with Jordan made Jericho a major destination for refugees. Besides Ein el-Sultan, two other camps were established: Aqbat Jabr and Nu´eima Camp (today Nu´eima village adjacent to Ein el-Sultan).

In the first years of its existence, it was administered by the Red Cross, which provided tents as shelters and service facilities. Three years later, in March 1951, UNRWA signed a contract with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and took over administration responsibilities. The contract contained a leasing agreement for 99 years starting in 1951, similar to most other Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 7). The big majority of the lands occupied by the camp are in private property (99.96%) and only a small portion of land belongs to the government (0.06%). The land ownership situation is confusing, as initially *"the land in Ein el Sultan and Nuway'meh was/is excluded from [the] settlement officially registered as Jedar Balad. This is the case of 97.42 % of Ein el Sultan camp lands and 79.95 % of Nuway'meh camp lands which are private lands and the Jordanian government paid the rent of it to the owners*

[sic!]" (Taleb 1999). There are sources claiming that UNRWA later paid a monthly rent to the private owner of the lands (see Al-Awadat 1990, S. 37).

FIGURE 11: ORIGIN OF REFUGEES IN EIN EL-SULTAN (MARKED WITH DOTS). SOURCE: UNRWA ICIP BETHLEHEM 2013B

The original refugee population had a strong Bedouin character and many families came from Ein Geddi, Beer Sheba, Dawayima but also from Jaffa and Ar Ramla City (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 7) and (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 5). While the camp accommodated around 15.000 refugees in the year after its establishment, the population of Ein el-Sultan reached almost 20.000 before the war of 1967.

Already since the 1950ies, refugees in Ein el-Sultan improved and expanded their tents with more steady materials as there was no end of the conflict in sight and the political situation stayed chaotic. UNRWA started to provide more facilities and services, like public bathrooms, schools, food and water distribution centres. The map of 1953 (see above) shows little permanent construction, as most shelters were tents, and big institutional UNRWA buildings in the south and north (these institutional compounds are still existing today). In 1956, UNRWA started replacing the tents with standard shelters and parcelled the land. UNWA provided wood to hold the roofs but the refugees constructed walls out of mud bricks and roofs out of reed[18] (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 8). The map of 1963 shows the new urban layout of the camp, with a road network that mostly resembles today's situation. The today's institutional compound on the western edge appears already on this historical map.

---

[18] In most other Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank, UNRWA provided concrete blocks. The change of material in Ein el-Sultan could have been a reaction to the hot climate and traditional building techniques of the area.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war marks a major change for Ein el-Sultans history. During the war, almost all camp residents fled over the nearby Jordan River into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as the West Bank was occupied by Israel. After three days, only a few hundred returned. The adjacent refugee camp Nu´eima was fully abandoned and closed at that time. In the 1960ies, the UNRWA schools were merged into one mixed gender school[19] and it was at his time, when families started expanding their plots, as there was a lot of unused land available. Only less than a thousand people lived in Ein el-Sultan in the period until the early 1990ies. In 1976 only 624 refugees were populating in the camp (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 7).

The Israeli occupation brought economic growth to the region and Ein el-Sultan as many residents were working in Israeli farms or in nearby Israeli settlements. A lot of investment in improving the houses and the infrastructure of the camp were made. In 1970, Jordan donated an electricity network to Ein el-Sultan and the surrounding area that was soon after destroyed by the IDF and later rebuilt by the camp residents themselves during the first intifada in the end of the 1980ies. During that

---

[19] The UNRWA school is mixed until today and causes many debates around the issue of mixing or dividing gender in education in Ein el-Sultan.

time, empty houses along the main streets were demolished by the IDF because they were seen as a security threat (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 8).

The next big break in the history of the West Bank brought big changes for Ein el-Sultan. When the Oslo agreements were signed, Jericho was the first city handed over to the PNA in 1994. A great number of so called PNA-returnees, PNA officials of the exile government, who had lived in exile (e.g. in Lebanon of Egypt) had to be accommodated in Jericho. After an agreement between PNA and UNRWA was reached, many of them settled in Ein el-Sultan[20], as there was an abundance of available space especially along the main road (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 8). This led to a decrease in population, but the number of residents never even closely reached the numbers of the establishment of the camp.

In the recent decades, Ein el-Sultan has become a popular place to build holiday homes for non-refugees, due to the privileged location and scenic views over the Jordan Valley.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS AND GOVERNANCE

As described earlier, there are usually many actors active in camps but at the same time, the exceptional political status of Palestinian refugee camps created a vacuum of governance. Compared to other camps in the West Bank "*Ein el-Sultan hosts very few local institution* "(UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 10). For a more detailed explanation of governance in camps in general, see chapter *Governance* on page 34. The following section gives a short overview over relevant actors for Ein el-Sultan.

Local Committee

As in most camps, Ein el-Sultan has a Local Committee (LC), sometimes also referred to as Popular or Camp Committee (see Misselwitz 2012, S. 29). The LC of Ein el-Sultan has been established in 1994 by the Department of Refugee Affairs (DORA) and is comprised of nine regular members which are appointed by the PNA and six additional employees (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 4). The LC understands its services and responsibilities in Ein el-Sultan as follows (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 5):

- establishing and maintaining the water network
- road construction and rehabilitation
- social development services

---

[20] Interestingly, Aqbat Jabr was not taking in returnees.

- implementing projects and case studies
- providing transportation
- protecting archaeological and historic sites in the camp
- providing kindergartens

The CIP for Ein el-Sultan describes the LC as a "*very resourceful committee compared to other camps [...] as the Committee is generating income through several projects and assets. It owns the camp water network and the Independence Garden, as well as is renting twenty licences for public transportation vehicles*" (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 10). The strong link to the PNA could be a critical point when assessing role of the LC. In an interview, a LC member assured that the committee is representing all milieus in the camp. As the members are not democratically elected but appointed by the PNA, it might be strongly influenced by PNA policies.

UNRWA

UNRWA plays a major part in all Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank. Also in Ein el-Sultan, UNRWA is a strong actor; especially the Camp Service Officer has a powerful position. In the camp, UNRWA is responsible for health, basic education and provides services in the field of social services, like job creation programs. The UNRWA CIP team has conducted a long participatory process during the last years, including an urban analysis and future vision for Ein el-Sultan. UNRWA owns[21] large portions of the land inside the camp, like the school compound, its surrounding areas and the vacant UNRWA compound in the northern edge of the camp. These lands have caused conflict between UNRWA and the Local Committee recently and it seems there is a recurring power struggle between these actors although they are cooperating on a daily basis and sharing a compound as headquarters. UNRWA officials are also appointed by the organisation and have a strong link with the refugee population in the camp, as per definition, the organisations is serving refugees only.

UNRWA is facing challenges with the demographic change in Ein el-Sultan, as they are serving everyone within the camps borders with e.g. garbage collection but get funds merely according to the number of registered refugees. That means that they are serving roughly a third of the camp without appropriate funding. This is a major problem for the organisation and will become even larger when the demographic trend continues. Mechanism of sharing certain services with the Jericho governorate might be needed.

---

[21] Within the limitations of ownership in the diffuse situation of land ownership in Palestinian refugee camps.

NGOs and CBOs

Although Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank are usually well served by NGOS, there are very few such organisations in Ein el-Sultan. The strongest NGO in the camp is the WOMEN PROGRAMME CENTRE, founded in 2006 by the Ministry of Social Affairs. This NGO is "*targeting children and women*", *invests in improvement of its facilities and builds ties to other organisations (e.g. UNRWA, GIZ) to enhance sustainability*" (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 10). It also organises and runs income generation projects targeting housewives.

The YOUTH CENTRE in Ein el-Sultan, founded in 1952 by the Ministry of Youth and Sports is less active although it offers recently refurbished infrastructure and good recreational facilities. According to the CIP, it is "*currently facing serious problems in fund raising and formulating a management committee*" "(UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 10). More vigorous is the FILISTINEUNA ("Our Palestine") Centre, focussing on local youth and local culture and folkloric traditions. Another active NGO in Ein el-Sultan is the charitable society called SHAQAÍQ AN NUʹMAN which provides different services to the camp residents (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 13). There is also a small FARMERS UNION representing farmers in the camp. In conclusion it can be said that, compared to other camps, the NGO sector is comparatively weak in Ein el-Sultan.

Other Stakeholders

Besides these more formal stakeholders, there are certain actors in Ein el-Sultan that are very influential on the political level. Major POLITICAL PARTIES are represented in the camp and the TANZIM organisation, will is affiliated to the Fatah party, was recently involved in a political conflict around electricity bills (see below). The community representation of families with Bedouin background called MOKHTAR is influential as well as some very POWERFUL FAMILIES and ELITE FIGURES.

Some external stakeholders are significant for Ein el-Sultan, like the JERICHO MUNICIPALITY and GOVERNORATE. PNA institutions like DORA and some MINISTRIES also are relevant for camp affairs.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHY

Population

It is hard to estimate the population of refugee camps in the West Bank as different sources state very different numbers and it is not clear if refugees, non-refugees are counted or not.

According to UNRWA 2295 inhabitants are living in the camp (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 9). In 2007, an UNRWA research report talks about 1.500 registered refugees and 660 non-refugees living in the camp (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 15). The Palestinian Bureau of Statistics states the number 3.017 inhabitants for 2007 living in 589 households in 653 housing units (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 7). It is not clear which numbers include or ignore non-refugees. To be safe, we can assume that there are between 2.000 and 3.000 inhabitants living in Ein el-Sultan[22]. The population numbers have been fluctuating strongly over the past due to historical events (see page 41). According to the data of ARIJ (see above), the average family size would be 5.12.

FIGURE 14: DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT. SOURCE: UNRWA ICIP BETHLEHEM 2013B

---

[22] This challenge of obtaining an accurate number on such a basic question like number of camp residents underlines the challenges in governments when it comes to Palestinian refugee camps.

The demographic development also shows the distinct historic situation of the refugee camps in Jericho. The history circumstances led to a large population upon establishment in 1948 and dramatic population losses after 1967. The population growth of Ein el-Sultan is one of the lowest of all camps. The extraordinary history of Ein el-Sultan shows when comparing its population development to other camps in the West Bank. While the overall development with a population decline due to the 1967 war occurs in most refugee camps in the area, only Aqbat Jabr shares Ein el-Sultan´s radical changes in population.

FIGURE 15: COMPARING POPULATION TRENDS IN WEST BANK REFUGEE CAMPS. SOURCE:

UNRWA UND SIAAL UNIVERSITY OF STUTTGART 2005

Regarding age distribution, most sources state nearly the same numbers. ARIJ states that 42.6% of the camps population (again most likely including all residents) are younger than 15, 53.9% between 15 and 64 years and 2.1% are older than 65 years (2012, S. 7).

For the following analysis, only UNRWA data has been used due to their availability over the past decades.

Social composition

Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank usually are very homogenously inhabited by registered refugees. According to the research by SIAAL and

UNRWA on refugee camps in the West Bank, 91% of the population in refugee camps are refugees registered in this camp[23], 5% are registered refugees with a different camp code and 4 percent are non-refugees (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 19).

When comparing this relation among all camps in the West Bank, it seems that most of the camps are very homogenous with three exceptions: Shufat Camp, which has a big non-refugee population because of its special location within Jerusalem[24], Jalazone camp and Ein el-Sultan (Taleb 2005, S. 14). Adwin Taleb argues, when talking about the real estate market in Palestinian refugee camps, that the *"involvement of non-refugee households in this phenomena can be considered a secondary matter in general, excepting [sic!] Sh'ufat camp and Jericho camps [where] they are a main actor in the real estate sector there"* (2005, S. 13–14).

Ein el-Sultan has the biggest portion of non-refugees living inside the camp borders. However, unlike most of the camps with a large non refugee population, the reason for the influx of non-refugees is not only limited to the fact that they are married to refugees and therefore move to the camp.

Although there is no definite information, one can assume that today around a third of the camps population are non-refugees (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 8). Earlier numbers mention lower numbers, e.g. according to the Palestinian National Census in December 1997,*"19% of the residents of Ein el Sultan camp and 10.4% of Aqbat Jabr were non-refugees. Out of 806 families of Aqbat Jabr in Februar [sic!]1997 were 137 (17%) non-refugee families and there were 46 non-refugee families residing in Ein el Sultan camp"* (Taleb 2005, S. 14).

In order to understand the exceptional social composition of Ein el-Sultan one needs to be aware of the unique historical development and location of the camp. Several historic events as well as its privileged and strategic location in the Jericho area have provided for a social structure that is more differentiated than in many other Palestinian refugee camps in the West

---

[23] UNRWA Refugee registrations include camp codes, allocating the refugee to a certain camp. "It is part of the Family Registration Number (8 digits) found on the Family Registration Card and which includes information regarding refugees and their respective camps. For example, Family Registration Number: 1-4-5-0-3999 an be broken down as such:
1 is for the Field Office: West Bank
4 indicates the Area: Jerusalem
5 indicates that the family is in a camp
0 indicates the name of the camp: Shu'fat
3999 indicates the name of the head of the family" (*UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 324*)
One does not lose this code when living somewhere else. This is part of the reason why statistics in this context are very imprecise.
[24] Residents of Shufat camp could obtain East Jerusalem residency rights for a certain period. Since it is accessible from the West Bank and Jerusalem, many Palestinians from the West Bank who wanted access to Jerusalem settled in Shufat (Taleb 2005, S. 14).

Bank. The division between these camp milieus is quite strong and appeared in all the interviews. There is no possibility to get any specific data on the size of these milieus. Of course there are grey areas and the danger of generalising is present, but nevertheless in order to be able to analyse social fragmentation, the following section introduces and characterises different camp milieus in Ein el-Sultan[25].

Original Refugees

The camp milieu of original refugees refers to those refugee families who settled in Ein el-Sultan when it was established in 1948. Most of these refugees left the camp in 1967, only around 150 families returned after a few days. Many of them have a Bedouin background and are originally from Bedouin areas, like Beer Sheba and Ein Geddi. Due to the fact that large parts of the camp were empty after the 1967 war, some of these families had the chance to occupy many plots which makes them powerful landowners in Ein el-Sultan until today. One interviewee mentioned that there are around four to five powerful families in this specific camp milieu of original refugees. Some of the families with Bedouin background continue to have livestock, like goats and chickens, inside the camp. It seems that original refugees are strongly represented in the camps NGOs and there are tight community ties within this milieu.

New-arrival refugees

The camp milieu of new-arrival refugees is very diverse. This milieu is made up of registered refugees who have moved to Ein el-Sultan after 1967 and therefore are not referred to as original refugees[26]. During the research, the author encountered new-arrivals, who arrived in the camp in the last decades, from as far as Syria and Gaza and as close as Bethlehem and Aqbat Jabr (the nearby refugee camp, also in the Jericho area.). The motive for moving was often marriage or other family related reasons. While this milieu can be seen as very diverse, there seems to be a self-perception as *refugee* and a closer relation with original refugees than with other milieus in the camp.

---

[25] This division is similar to the partition Adwin Taleb introduced in his text about the real estate market in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank, when talking about the actors in this context within the camp. He mentions two more actors: former residents, registered as refugees from the camp and real estate firms. These two actors have not appeared in this research in Ein el-Sultan (see 2005, S. 13–14)

[26] Some of them are registered to Ein el-Sultan, some to other camps.

PNA-returnees

The name PNA returnees (or simply returnees) are a specific group of officials of the Palestinian National Authority who were living in exile in different Arab countries until the Oslo agreements 1993. When Jericho became the first Palestinian city under PNA administration, many exiled officials moved to the city and due to the abundance of available space in Ein el-Sultan, the PNA managed, in accordance with UNRWA, to allocate plots to some of them in the camp. Many of them built houses along the main street and close to the old UNRWA compound. Even if they have a story of displacement, returnees are not considered or registered by UNRWA as refugees. Some of them are still affiliated with the PNA, some have stopped working with them or are retired. They are economically comparably powerful as many work with the PNA and some have businesses along the main road.

According to Adwan Taleb, many returnees in Ein el-Sultan and Aqbat Jabr camps sold their land or buildings without permits, expanded their land that was initially allocated to them by UNRWA "*and/or exploit their buildings for commercial use*" (2005, S. 14).

Holiday makers

A relatively new milieu in Ein el-Sultan are Palestinians with a wealthier background buying land and building holiday homes in Ein el-Sultan. As the Jericho region is a very popular holiday destination and many Palestinians have a weekend house in the area, Ein el-Sultan became a good option for such an investments, as the location is good (views, climate) and building is less complicated than outside the camp. There is a lack of building regulations within camps and due to the complicated legal status of camps, taxes are sometimes not collected and certain services like garbage collection are provided gratuitous by UNRWA.

These real estate transactions and buildings are clearly violations against UNRWA rules, still UNRWA finds it hard to regulate these activities (Taleb 2005, S. 14): "*Although UNRWA resorts to the law to resolve the violations in Ein el-Sultan and Aqabat Jabr camps and to halt the construction, the legal authorities postpone matters and refrain from passing judgements. The authorities fail to act despite the clarity of the UNRWA permits and copies of warnings sent to transgressors".*

Many members of this new milieu in Ein el-Sultan are from Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In the camp, they are normally referred to as *Jerusalemites,* hence this is also the term used in this document. Some of the holiday houses are in the upper areas of the camp with privileged views and climate.

They usually come over weekends and have limited interaction with the rest of the camp.

FIGURE 16: DIAGRAM OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE. SOURCE: ORIGINAL FIGURE

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Data on economic activities in camps is difficult to attain and needs to be understood as an approximation. UNRWA for example collects data about the economic situation of registered refugees but not about non-refugees, and other sources do not clarify whether they include data on refugees or not. However, although the data is imprecise, this section will present some basic numbers from different sources to help understand the economic structure in Ein el-Sultan.

According to UNRWA, the economic situation of refugees in Ein el-Sultan is better than in most other camps in the West Bank. The share of special hardship cases, refugees in a category defined by UNRWA who are in need for special support, was around 1.25% of the refugee population in 2003. In other camps, it was as high as 5% and the average lied roughly at 3.2% of the registered camp population (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 21).

When it comes to monthly income, Ein el-Sultan is among the camps with the highest average (again data from 2003) with 1500 new Israeli shekel (NIS). Shufat camp has by far the highest average monthly income, 4000 NIS, due to its privileged location in East Jerusalem. The average for all camps in the West Bank is around 1200 NIS (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 21).

The numbers on the unemployment rate are totally dissimilar when looking at different sources and therefore somewhat unusable. UNRWA stated a very high rate of unemployment of around 40% (probably only regarding refugees) (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 39). The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics states an unemployment rate of around 10% for the year 2007 (2009).

ARIJ obtained economic data from a field study about distribution of labour in Ein el-Sultan that most likely included refugees and non-refugees (they do not specify). According to them, trade and services are the dominant economic sectors with 61%, followed by the agricultural sector with 35% and industry with 4% (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 9)

URBAN ANALYSIS

The spatial configuration, land use pattern and infrastructure of most Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and beyond are mostly a common characteristic that is strongly linked with camp identity. These camps are usually dense structures with multileveled uses and weak infrastructure. Ein el-Sultan is a clear exemption regarding this context and makes the exceptional position of the camp very obvious. Ein el-Sultan does not resemble most other refugee camps in the region, a fact that is noticeable at first sight.

The following section provides a basic urban analysis, including land uses, built environment, public space and infrastructure. Most data comes from the Ein el-Sultan CIP.

Built environment

When comparing basic urban indicators of Ein el-Sultan, it becomes quite obvious that this camp has a different spatial structure than most other Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank [27] (see UNRWA und

---

[27] There is few data available and the few sources have partly inconsistent numbers due to different base data and varying ways of calculating. It seems the CIP for Ein el-Sultan has more accurate data than other more general assessments. In order to be able to compare to

SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005). The size of the camp, 87 ha, is the second largest amongst all camps in the West Bank, only Aqbat Jabr is significantly larger (170 ha). Most camps in the West Bank have around 30 ha (the average size is 32.7 ha), the smallest camp is Beit Jibrin with only 2.8 ha. When it comes to population, Ein el-Sultan is among the smallest camps in the West Bank with less than 3000 residents. Balata refugee camp near Nablus is the camp with the largest population (ca. 22.000 residents); the average population is around 8.600.

The population density of Ein el-Sultan is, with around 25 persons per hectare, by far the lowest in the West Bank, with Camp Number 1 in the Nablus area having the highest (ca. 1280 persons/ha) and the average being ca. 485 persons per hectare. Only Aqbat Jabr has a similarly low density with around 37 persons/ha.

The private areas, including buildings and private open spaces (gross building area) in Ein el-Sultan are above average of all Palestinian refugee camps in West Bank (78.45%). In Ein el-Sultan, around 87% of the total area is either built up area or land within plots. Again Camp Number 1 marks the extreme, with 96.6%. The high percentage in Ein el-Sultan is misleading as it might suggest that it is a very dense urban structure.

In fact, the percentage of actually built space, including private houses, shacks and institutions but not private and public open spaces (net built up area) is exceptionally low, with 17.63%. This is by far the lowest amount of built up area together with Aqbat Jabr (14.72%). The average across the West Bank is 47.43% with Camp Number 1 having the largest portion of built up area with 72.46%. These numbers gives an idea on the spatial exceptional status of Ein el-Sultan and to a certain extent also of Aqbat Jabr.

These two numbers indicate that the share of private gardens, meaning open spaces, which are not accessible by the public, in Ein el-Sultan account for around 70% of the land in the camp[28].

When looking at open spaces, including all private and public open areas, a similar exceptional situation is evident. The camps in Jericho have by far the largest percentage of open areas in the entire West Bank. In Ein el-Sultan 82.37% of the land within the camp borders is open space (unbuilt), in Aqbat Jabr open space accounts for 85.28% of the land. The average for all camps in the West Bank is 52.2% with Camp Number 1 having only 27.54 %.

---

other refugee camps in the West Bank, this document uses the data from those more general assessments, which include numbers on more camps even though the data might be less precise.

[28] The CIP Ein el-Sultan comes to a similar conclusion (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 22)

A good indicator for understanding the density of urban environments is the floor space index (FSI)[29], which specifies the relation of land with the built space taking into account the number of floors of buildings. Again Aqbat Jabr and Ein el-Sultan have by far the lowest value. The FSI of Ein el-Sultan is as low as 0.31[30], the one of Aqbat Jabr is even lower, with 0.24. The next lowest FSI of a camp in the West Bank is 0.62 of Fa´ra camp in the Nablus area. The average FSI for all camps is 1.14 and the highest value can be found in Shufat camp in Jerusalem with 1.89.

---

[29] FSI, in German *Geschoßflächenzahl* , usually is used for individual plots. In this case it indicates the built up area multiplied with the average number of floors throughout the camp divided by the total area.

[30] The CIP Ein el-Sultan calculates a FSI of 0.20 (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 22).

The image of Palestinian refugee camps in general is dominated by multi-storey buildings that are expanded vertically whenever the families require more living space. Ein el-Sultan on the other hand has the character of a low-rise suburban neighbourhood. Most of the buildings have only one or two floors. Only along the main street, the zone with stronger economic potential, and to a lesser extent on the north eastern edge many houses have more storeys. The average number of floors in Ein el-Sultan is roughly 1.5 (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 20).

Land Use

There is no such thing as a land use or zoning plan for refugee camps in the West Bank. Nevertheless UNRWA collects and provides data on the uses of buildings for all camps in the West Bank.

FIGURE 23: LAND USES. SOURCE: UNRWA ICIP BETHLEHEM 2013B

Ein el-Sultan can be characterised to a large extent as a residential camp with low commercial and mixed uses. Compared to other camps, the commercial uses are more scattered and there is no real commercial centre within the camp. The only concentration of businesses can be found along the main road with shops and workshops targeting especially customers outside the camp. Ein el-Sultan lacks a busy shopping street or urban centre. Many other camps have cultural or commercial centres where public activities are concentrated, e.g. in Dheheishe, where the camp centre is a place where *"major commercial, cultural, religious, and administrative functions [...] are brought together into what has become an urban centre* (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 113). The lack of a camp centre is one of the most pressing needs defined in the participatory planning process of the CIP in Ein el-Sultan (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013a, S. 15). The only spaces where there is a concentration of other uses besides residential use are the main road and two institutional clusters. The

main road does not really act as a centre for the camp since it is not centrally located (the main road marks one of the fringes of the camp) and the concentration of souvenir shops seem to cater more to tourists than the local population. Regarding the institutional clusters, one of them is located on the western edge and is comprised of the CSO office, the local committee and the Women Centre; the other institutional cluster is located also on the main road and is made up by the UNRWA School and UNRWA Clinic. Although both these clusters are actively used by the community and act as meeting points, the activities that happen inside these compounds are controlled and directed by the different institutions that make up this space. These compounds also have specific opening and closing hours.

The land use analysis of UNRWA does not cover economic activities in Ein el-Sultan but according to the Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ), there are currently roughly fifteen stores (including supermarkets, fruit & vegetable shops, butcheries, etc.), ten workshops and ten other service stores (e.g. internet cafes, hairdressers, etc.) in Ein el-Sultan (see 2012, S. 9–10). The Directorate of Agriculture in Jericho stated that there is no agricultural cultivation in Ein el-Sultan (2010/2011), but ARIJ mentions that there might be a *"high proportion of small and fragmented holdings (home gardens)"* (2012, S. 12). ARIJ also did a survey on domestic animals and found that only 7% of the population in Ein el-Sultan are keeping animals like sheep and bees. There are a few stone cutting factories inside the camp borders.

In the land use plan, these uses fall in the category of *other uses*. The CIP points out that "*it seems that the newer residents of the camp, which are generally settled in the northern edge of the camp, are not engaged in keeping domestic animals as much as the traditional population*" (2013b, S. 18). Also the zones along the main street and next to the abandoned UNRWA compound in the north eastern corner do not accommodate such uses which can be explained by the concentration of returnees.

Social Expulsion

There is a trend regarding real estate in Ein el-Sultan that could remind us of social expulsion[31], especially having in mind the rising number of holiday homes and wealthy members of the Palestinian society buying houses in the camp. According to Sami Murra, an urban planner at the UNRWA CIP Team, the land prices in the camp (around 40.000-60.000 JD per dunum[32]) match

---

[31] The working title of this thesis was *The Gentrified Refugee Camp.* This title has been dismissed as it became clearer in the research, that the dynamics of Ein el-Sultan do not resemble typical gentrification processeso. The term used in this research is spatial expulsion.

[32] A *dunum* is a common Arabic measurement of land, and is equivalent to 1000m2.   Land prices in denser camps in a more central location in the West Bank are mostly higher.

prices in similar locations in the rest of Jericho (Kostenwein 11.03.2013). Especially the higher areas in the camp are attracting many temporary holiday homes. The camp residents are aware of this process and talk about "strangers buying houses" or even see the camp as a *hotel* (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2012b). This dynamic has an influence on the camps space, social structure and infrastructure but it seems that there is no *push effect,* forcing less wealthy residents to move out. One explanation is the abundance of space available, Sami Murra argues that "*Ein el-Sultan can easily absorb more people*" (Kostenwein 11.03.2013). Besides that there are many empty plots available in Ein el-Sultan, most families have the option of expanding their houses horizontally, as there are vast gardens, as well as vertically, as the current building heights are very low. However, we encountered some minor complaints about the development of the real estate market in the Camp during the interviews.

Today and in the near future, Ein el-Sultan will not be affected by a spatial expulsion process unless the population increase accelerates profoundly. It might be interesting to investigate this issue again in 10-15 years when spatial resources might be reduced.

Public Space

Although there is an abundance of open spaces in the camp, they are mostly not accessible for the public as they are private gardens. Only around 14% of the land in Ein el-Sultan is publicly accessible open space, like streets and squares (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 21). Nevertheless, Ein el-Sultan has one of the highest rates of public space per person among refugee camps in the West Bank with around 50m2 per capita. The especially dense Camp Number 1 can only provide 0.26m2 per camp resident and a more typical refugee camp, like Aida camp has around 3.5m2 per camp dweller[33].

Ein el-Sultan lacks a camp centre and urban squares with high urban quality, which, as mentioned above, is a crucial problem for the camp residents. Public spaces in Ein el-Sultan are barely used and there is no focal point of activity. There are a few pedestrian axes that are mostly used by school children but besides the peak hours there is very little activity. The UNRWA CIP team has tried to activate public space by providing street furniture (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 45) on selected corners of the camp.

One major problem of the low activity in public open spaces is the lack of shade and street lighting. There is hardly any vegetation in the streets and only sometimes, trees from private gardens also provide some shade from

---

[33] Calculations based on UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 15

the strong sun in the street. At night, when the weather is cooler, the lack of street light makes activities in public space very hard. Hence, social interactions are mostly happening in private gardens.

Few semi-public spaces are providing shade and furniture, like the compound of UNRWA and the local committee. One place often mentioned when talking about public spaces in the camp is the Independence Garden (Isteklal), which is owned by the local committee and usually leased to a private contractor. This garden was seen as the sole public space by many residents and is currently out of use and was vandalised due to political conflicts.

Infrastructure

Social Infrastructure

There are three privately run kindergartens in Ein el-Sultan (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 8).The camp is served by one school in the primary level run by UNRWA. It is unusual that a Palestinian refugee camp has only one school as genders are usually divided. Due to the strong decrease of camp residents following the 1967 war, the formerly existing two schools were combined and a mixed gender school was formed. The absence of secondary educational facilities forces children to commute to Jericho after primary education.

There are two health clinics in Ein el-Sultan; one run by UNRWA and one private clinic. The heath facilities are often criticised by camp residents and there is a severe lack of some health related services (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 28).

Mobility and Public Transport

Ein el-Sultan´s street infrastructure is in relatively good condition and not facing the usual problems of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank like congestion or overcrowding. The 16 km of streets in Ein el-Sultan (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 13) are mostly wide enough for cars and even emergency vehicles[34] and due to the relative emptiness and lack of street activity they could be even called underused.

---

[34] The lack of accessibility for emergency vehicles, like firefighter trucks, is a major problem for many refugee camps in the region.

The only streets which could be characterised as *primary streets,* with heavy traffic and adjacent commercial uses are the bordering main streets.

Ein el-Sultan is served by privately run service taxis[35] that are running between Jericho and the camp without a regular schedule. They are licenced by the local committee and mark an important income for the institution (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 20). Within the camp, walking is the main mode of mobility and the topography allows biking to be a convenient choice of transport, but is mostly only accessible to children and men due to cultural reasons[36].

Technical Infrastructure

Ein el-Sultan is not connected to the sewage system and is relying on percolation pits which have dangerous consequences for health and environment. This a main concern of the camp residents (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 32).

Ein el-Sultan does not have street lighting in the majority of its streets, only "*some private houses provide light for the street* " (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 22). The lack of street lights in most parts of the camp increases the sense of insecurity and makes the use of public space almost impossible in the evening, when the weather would allow it. This might contribute to the lack of street activity. An investigation of the little existing street lights (not all of them are in service) showed that the lamp posts exist along the main road (as part of the Jericho system) and the area in the northwest. These two areas are mostly inhabited by returnees. The question if this is a coincidence or a consequence of the political influences and privileges by the returnees in not clear and would require more investigation. The need for street lighting is often being articulated by the residents and the local committee (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 13).

UNRWA is cooperating with the council of Jericho in terms of garbage collection. UNRWA employees are collecting garbage from households and businesses and transport them to collection points, from where the public service from Jericho takes over and is responsible for final disposal (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 14). As mentioned earlier, UNRWA is facing difficulties providing services in Ein el-Sultan as the allocation of funds for these activities is organised by the number of registered refugees in the camp. With such a high number of non-refugees living within the camp borders, the quality of service like garbage collection

---

[35] Service taxis are the main mode of public transport in the West Bank. They are privately run shared taxis and have fixed prices and routes but no predetermined stops and are mostly run by minibuses or cars.
[36] The Jericho region is the only area in the West Bank and maybe even in the larger region (except Israel) where biking is popular.

is decreasing[37] (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2012b). Camp residents complain about the fact that the amount of allocated water stays the same, because the number of registered refugees is stable, but more and more non-refugees are moving into the camp (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2012a). There is a sense of injustice especially when it comes to the Jerusalemites, who are perceived by the rest of the residents of the camp as sole consumers of the camps services and infrastructure without contributing to the community in any way (Kostenwein 11.03.2013). The notion of wealthy citizens receiving refugee privileges is causing complaints among many camp residents.

Water is provided by the public water network of Jericho since 2001 (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 14) and the water system is very good compared to other camps, even though there are at times problems with low water pressure (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 30).

In terms of electricity, Ein el-Sultan is connected to the public network since 1989 (see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2012, S. 13). Most of the Palestinian refugee camps do not pay their electricity fees due to political reasons. Also in this sense, Ein el-Sultan marks an exception as residents are usually paying for this service. Only recently there has been a controversy related to this issue as some political parties tried to convince residents to stop paying in order to comply with the common strategy of camps in the West Bank[38].

THE SPECIAL ROLE OF EIN EL-SULTAN REFUGEE CAMP

The urban, economic, historical and sociodemographic analyses indicate that Ein el-Sultan takes an exceptional role in the context of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank: In most categories, the attributes and characteristic of Ein el-Sultan are very different from most other camps. In order to summarize these differences, this section will compare some key urban indicators of selected refugee camps in the West Bank. Besides, Ein el-Sultan, the analysed camps are:

1. Aqbat Jabr – selected because of the location close to Ein el-Sultan and the similar character
2. Camp Number 1 – selected due to location in the north and the small size
3. Qalandiya – selected due to its urban location, the large size and location in the central West Bank

---

[37] Currently there are only two persons working in garbage collection in the whole camp.
[38] Ein el-Sultan is one of the few camps in the West Bank where residents pay the bills for electricity and water themselves. In other camps, these bills are covered by the PNA.

4. Arroub – selected due to its rural location and its location in the south

5. Shufat – selected because of its exceptional status of being partly within East Jerusalem

Refugee Camp	Refugee population[39]	Estimated non refugees[40] /share of estimated total in percent	Size (ha)	Population density [41] (person/ha)	Net built up area in percent[42]	FSI[43]
Ein el-Sultan	1500	660/30.5%	87	24.8	17.63%	0.31
Aqbat Jabr	5757	600/9.4%	170	37.4	14.72%	0.24
Camp Number 1	5663	103/1.78%	45.1	1279	72.46%	1.71
Qalandiya	10757	745/6.4%	28	411.3	39.66%	1.13
Arroub	7000	155/2.1%	42.7	167.8	29.35%	0.77
Shufat	11000	4500/29%	20.3	762.1	56.89%	1.89

In summary, it seems obvious that Ein el-Sultan has exceptional values in all categories. It is one of the largest camps in the West Bank but has one of the smallest populations, resulting in the lowest population density. Its share of residents who not registered refugees of the camp is very high and the FSI is among the lowest of all camps.

The only camp that resembles Ein el-Sultan in many aspects is Aqbat Jabr, especially when it comes to spatial indicators and demographic evolution. The big difference between these two camps in the Jericho area is the social composition. Aqbat Jabr does not have such a large portion of non-refugees living inside the camp borders. During interviews with residents in Ein el-Sultan, the notion of Aqbat Jabr being perceived as a camp and Ein el-Sultan not, appeared several times. At this point, it is not possible to say, whether Aqbat Jabr is in a similar situation concerning spatial and social fragmentation as Ein el-Sultan as there is hardly any research on Aqbat Jabr. Several sources state, that Aqbat Jabr has a strong political camp identity and is one of the leading camps in the discourse of Palestinian refugees (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). Another indicator for a strong camp identity is the

---

[39] Only registered refugees 2006
[40] Refugees not registered to the specific camp, estimated by the CBOs in 2006
[41] Based on estimated actual population 2006
[42] actually built space, including private houses, shacks and institutions but not private and public open spaces
[43] Floor space index (Geschossflächenzahl)

existence of a camp entrance memorial with the symbol of the key, which is standing for the right to return. It would be an interesting next step of this research to analyse Aqbat Jabr with its similar spatial characteristics but a different social composition and identity.

THE SOCIOSPATIAL FRAGMENTATION OF EIN EL-SULTAN

This chapter presents the findings of the research. First, the defined categories are introduced, and secondly the interrelations between those categories are analysed.

CATEGORIES

In accordance with the grounded theory methodology, the process of coding produced a range of analytic categories that have evolved, merged or changed hierarchy throughout the research process. In this section, the final categories including some sub-categories are introduced.

Social Fragmentation

One of the most striking aspects of life in Ein el-Sultan is social fragmentation. This strong fragmentation between social milieus in the camp is not obvious but "hidden under the surface", as one new- arrival refugee formulates it. The yearlong Camp Improvement process in Ein el-Sultan tapped superficially on the social divide inside the camp, however it wasn´t until this research began conducting interviews with individuals of the different camp milieus, that the breaks and cracks within the social structure were clearly revealed. These breaks and cracks are fundamental and the language used by the interviewees is strong and specific. One interviewee described the relation between refugees and returnees as "not loving". One refugee complained about the "big ego" of the returnees, one returnee even called the relationship between refugees and returnees "failed". Others mention that there is no interaction among the camp milieus; refugees from Ein el-Sultan have "stronger relationships to people from Jericho than to returnees". This lack of relations is especially true for the Jerusalemites, who only live in their holiday homes temporarily and are said by the rest of the community to "isolate" themselves and to not have any interest in social interaction and are "not part of the community" but "just guests"[44].   One interviewee even called the Jerusalemites as "antisocial", another one mentioned a "denial of community" regarding the Jerusalemites. A common example of the perceived lack of identification with the camps is the story of Jerusalemites dumping garbage on the streets and congesting public space in the camp.

Ein el-Sultan is not seen as one community[45] and the lines between the camp milieus are strong. More than one time, residents of the camp stated, that marriage between the milieus in the camps is not common.

At least within some milieus there seem to be close relations, especially the original refugees are a close community with strong social ties.

Neighbourhood Relations and Community Engagement

Almost all interviewees mentioned that they live in neighbourhoods that are mixed between the camp milieus of Ein el-Sultan. The impressions of the neighbourhood relations are varied. Some stated that the relations are "good", "strong"; one returnee describes the relation as "good but little".

---

[44] The author tried persistently to contact members of this social group but failed, as the available entry points and contact persons did not know how to get in touch with any Jerusalemite even though they are neighbours.

[45] There was only one exception to this notion: A New-Arrival from Jerusalem appreciated the sense of community in Ein el-Sultan, also because he was feeling and fleeing the lack of community and "Arabic Hospitality" in Jerusalem, where in his opinion, the thin social borders between Palestinians, Jews and Internationals are threatening community life.

One example of good neighbourhood relations is the fact, that one interviewee points out that he was able to negotiate building distances (three meters) between their houses although the absence of rules or legislation in such a case.

One new-arrival refugee defines his neighbourhood relationships as bad, "especially with Jerusalemites". This might be linked to the notion of self-isolation of the temporary residents mentioned above. One Bedouin family pointed out that they have no relationships with any neighbour. It might be possible, that in this particular case, none of her neighbours are original refugees.

When reflecting on this aspect, there was a feeling that people felt hostility toward a certain milieu in general, however when talking about a specific person belonging to this milieu, like a neighbour or acquaintance, they didn´t seem to have a problem; this person was an exception. It seemed that while there are many stereotypes towards other milieus, they defuse when it comes to personal contacts and individual relationships.

Nevertheless, the neighbourhood relations seem to be weaker than in other refugee camps in the West Bank. While neighbours in Ein el-Sultan might visit important social events, like weddings or funerals, it is not common for women of Ein el-Sultan to visit other houses for lunch, which, for instance, happens often in Aqbat Jabr.

Community engagement is a strong characteristic of many Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Middle East. Camps in the West Bank are considered cultural and political hotspots and NGOs and CBOs are a common form of organisation. Sandi Hilal, the former director of the CIP in the West Bank, calls Dheheishe Camp in Bethlehem as the place with the highest density of NGOs in the World (Kostenwein 2012/2013). And compared to the roughly 30 NGOs in Dheheishe (on just half a km2), Ein el-Sultan´s four NGOs are an indicator also for a comparably weak community engagement. One has to mention, that is not known if the residents of Ein el-Sultan are especially engaged in NGOs outside the camp, e.g. in Jericho. Interviewees state that engagement for the community is "less than in other camps" and a refugee calls the local organisations even "inactive"[46]. Hilal notices a strong individualistic character in Ein el-Sultan (Kostenwein 25.07.2014).

---

[46] The author himself experienced two very active CBOs during the Camp Improvement Process in Ein el-Sultan.

The social fragmentation described above is also very visible in the way the few NGOs in the camp are perceived. For some, the only perceived active group in the local organisations are the refugees, who are actually managing most of the NGOs. One refugee sees the NGOs and CBOs as spaces mostly for the original refugees as they are the ones who "know about history and culture of the camp" and unlike other camp residents, they actually consider Ein el-Sultan a *camp*. One returnee perceives the organisations as unjust as they "only serve some few families".

Correspondingly also besides the organised forms of community engagement, some milieus observe an unbalanced commitment between the different milieus of Ein el-Sultan. One new-arrival refugee tells the story of the recent UNRWA strike[47], which caused a breakdown of the garbage collection system in the camp. According to him, only original refugees organised and removed the piles of garbage that congested the camp.

Community engagement is clearly weak when compared to other refugee camps in the West Bank (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 6). The low number of NGOs and CBOs is a strong indicator, as well as the low organisation beyond these entities. The fact that the social divide is also an important aspect when talking about issues of community engagement is surprising and underlines the notion of perceived social fragmentation in Ein el-Sultan.

---

[47] Strikes of UNRWA employees are very common and happen every few years. In 2012/13, a conflict between the strong unions and the UNRWA management caused a more than three month long strike, which left the camps in the West Bank without important services, like education, health and garbage collection.

During the interviews, it appeared that the perception of marginalisation in Ein el-Sultan differs from camp milieu to camp milieu. The only thing most interviewees could agree on is the existence of marginalisation. The topic of discrimination and marginalisation is prominent in the discourse of Palestinian refugee camps, especially outside the West Bank and Gaza, where the institutional discrimination is strongly affecting Palestinian refugees[48]. Marginalisation of groups within camps in the West Bank is also a known phenomenon, particularly when it comes to the divide of refugees that are involved in the PNA and refugees who are not (Kostenwein July 2014), even though the relationship between these two groups is not generally bad and there are many refugees engaged within the PNA (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). In the case of Ein el-Sultan, the situation is more complex and even paradox, as the camp allowed the returning PLO members to settle in the camp, knowing that their return contradicts in a way the very right to return of refugees themselves[49]. In that sense the return of the returnees might have jeopardized the return of the original refugees to their home villages.

Ilana Feldman mentions in an article on Emergency Aid in Palestine that there is a general increase of class diversity and therefore "*changing social relations in the camps*" (see 2013, S. 14) of the West Bank. Nevertheless, the extent of perceived marginalisation and the central role it played in the interviews in Ein el-Sultan seems exceptional.

Due to the special history of the camp, milieus from very diverse backgrounds and with very different history have settled in Ein el-Sultan and there are strong perceptions of marginalisation among the different milieus. Only the recipient of discrimination (the victim), never the discriminator, is aware of marginalisation (or talks about it). These perceptions are contradictive, reciprocal and unveil the complex social structure of the camp.

Especially between the milieus of refugees and returnees exists a mutual feeling of marginalisation. For refugees, political dominance of the returnees with their strong links to the PNA is a threat and they resent the economic privilege of the returnees who own the businesses along the main road. One refugee expressed that he felt the returnees have taken the rights of the refugees. He states that the returnees "are on our back". This

---

[48] E.g.: In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees are officially forbidden to work in 70 different occupations and are prohibited to settle outside of camps. In Jordan, one can talk about a two-class society. Citizens with Jordanian origin are widely privileged over citizens with Palestinian origin.
[49] The PNA was founded after the Oslo accords, recognising the 1967 borders and therefore perceived as diminishing chances of return for refugees beyond that area.

conception seems to be mostly based in the conflict over privileged land and economic power.

On the other hand the returnees express their concerns towards refugees based on a feeling of "not being welcome" and the financial power of especially original refugees[50]. One interviewee mentions that he felt welcomed in the beginning but now he feels marginalised, because he is not from here. The dominance of refugees in NGOs and CBOs was also indicated and understood as an act of marginalisation several times.

The question if these reciprocal perceptions of marginalisation are strongly manifested in actual social conflicts is hard to answer. While many camp residents across the different camp milieus are appreciating the quietness and the absence of "trouble" in Ein el-Sultan, one Bedouin states that there are strong conflicts. Despite this opinion, it appears that social conflicts (besides the usual problems between families that are mostly solved by the community itself) are rare and the perceived discrimination does not lead to confrontation but rather to fragmentation. Nonetheless, more research and time would be necessary to fully comprehend social conflicts in Ein el-Sultan, as one refugee says that conflicts are not obvious but subtle and hidden.

Public Space as a non-social and non-political space

Whenever members from Campus in Camps visited Ein el-Sultan, they voiced their confusion concerning the lack of a *camp feeling* in the street (Kostenwein 18.07.2013). One element that makes life in refugee camps in the West Bank special is the intensive use of public space. The street is used as playground, for celebrations and economic activities (see UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 74). Ein el-Sultan does not have such lively public spaces. The CIP for Ein el-Sultan comes to the conclusion that "*the camp lacks social activities in public space and is often perceived as "boring". The streets in the camp are mostly empty, social activities are confined to private spaces*" (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013, S. 39). One camp resident expresses her feelings towards this circumstance: "*When I walk from A to B in the camp, I don't meet anyone. There is no one interacting in the street!*" (UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2012b).

One explanation for the absence of activity could be the extremely hot climate but the nearby city of Jericho is sharing the same weather and has very active public spaces. However, the fact that the rich vegetation in Ein el-Sultan, providing shade and relief from the strong sun are confined to private gardens might contribute to the seldom use of public spaces for

---

[50] Based on the ownership of land.

social activities. In the best case, there is some shadow overspill from the private gardens towards the street.

Whenever camp residents were asked about public space in Ein el-Sultan they described it as quiet and empty or even doubted the existence of public spaces in general. One returnee stated that "we do not have public spaces here". The only space being recognised as public is the Isteklal (independence) garden[51], which is currently closed and suffered acts of vandalism[52]. There are very few commercial activities in Ein el-Sultan and most shopping is done outside the camp. One interviewee states this as an explanation for the lack of street life.

FIGURE 26: VAST EMPTY PUBLIC SPACES. SOURCE: TAKEN BY AUTHOR

The fact that there are large resources of open spaces in Ein el-Sultan (see urban analysis chapter, page 60), makes the low level of activities even more

---

[51] The garden is currently closed because of "disputes over its administration, it is abandoned and in bad condition. One part of the park could be opened for the community whereas the other part would be privately run as it was in the past" seeUNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 24.

[52] Acts of vandalism in Palestinian refugee camps often target public facilities like gardens and playgrounds as a study in Jordan indicates seeMisselwitz 2012, S. 37.

surprising, as open public spaces are usually very scarce in Palestinian refugee camps (see Misselwitz 2012, S. 37).

Also in the topic of public space, the perceived fragmentation appears. One new-arrival refugee feels that only refugees care for public space in the camp. When asked about conflicts in public space, the answer is mostly that there is no such thing. The lack of activity could also explain the lack of conflicts in public space.

One manifestation of the political discourse in Palestinian refugee camps in the region is political graffiti in public space. Most walls inside refugee camps are carrying some sort of political message creating a graffiti scene that has attracted international graffiti artists who are constantly visiting the region. Aysar Alsaifi, who worked in the interview team, is running a project in Dheheishe refugee camp in Bethlehem, which is producing and discussing political graffiti in public space. When he visited Ein el-Sultan, he was shocked about the absence of graffiti on the walls. There is hardly any graffiti to be found in the camp, apart from a few indicating the direction to the mosque. Besides graffiti, it is very common to find political posters either of political parties or of martyrs. The lack of this form of public political discourse is typical for Ein el-Sultan and its disintegration of the strong political discourse of other Palestinian refugee camps.

Many Palestinian refugee camps especially in the West Bank are spaces of political representation and confrontation in public space. This is partly due to the location close to the occupying power. Some camps are located in areas controlled and administered by Israel[53]; some are located at hotspots of the conflict in the West Bank[54]. Therefore, the public space regularly becomes a space of public protest and violent clashes with the IDF (see UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 28). Ein el-Sultan is located in Jericho area that usually does not witness many protests or confrontations between Palestinians and the IDF and the public space in the camp is therefore very seldom a stage for such events.

Spatial Fragmentation

Spatial fragmentation can be understood as the spatial manifestation of social fragmentation or inequality (see page 13). The amount of marginalisation – or better perceived marginalisation – in Ein el-Sultan would suggest a strong spatial fragmentation. And in fact, spatial

---

[53] E.g. Arroub camp is embedded in area C which is fully governed by the Israelis. A watchtower has been erected right opposite of the camps entrance and raids and confrontations are a common phenomenon.
[54] E.g. the camps in the Bethlehem area, especially Aida camp, which is surrounded by the separation Wall and site of regular violent clashes. Another example is Qualandiya refugee camp, located close to the Checkpoint Qualandiya, a much contested checkpoint.

fragmentation was one of the aspects that drew the interest of the author of this thesis to Ein el-Sultan. While it is also true that not necessarily all marginalisation or inequality is manifested in space, it seems to be the case to a certain extent in Ein el-Sultan.

While most interviewees perceive the camp as mixed with only some exceptions, one resident stated that "refugees live close to each other, so do returnees". In fact there are several indicators for spatial fragmentation in Ein el-Sultan. Indeed, spatial fragmentation seems to be one of the main causes for social conflict and perceived marginalisation as the spatial concentration of returnees along the main street has been brought up a lot by refugees who feel excluded from economic activities in the camp.

The spatial fragmentation in Ein el-Sultan takes two forms: Fragmentation of Neighbourhoods, and Segregation of Houses.

Fragmentation of Neighbourhoods

While large parts of Ein el-Sultan seem to have a mixed population (concerning the discussed camp milieus) there are several zones of homogeneity and fragmentation. The most obvious fragmented zone (that was marked in all the mental maps produced) is the strip along the main street in the east of the camp. This zone is mostly populated by returnees (see p. 41) and has the highest concentration of shops and workshops. As this area marks the zone with the highest economic potential it is significantly conflicted. As mentioned above, refugees complain about the returnees occupying the main street. There is a sentiment that "returnees have taken control over the main street", which "should be for the original refugees".

FIGURE 27: COMMERCIAL ZONE ON THE MAIN ROAD. SOURCE: TAKEN BY AUTHOR

Another zone mostly inhabited by returnees and many of the powerful elite[55] in the camp is the area next to the old UNRWA school on the northern edge of the camp. One new-arrival refugee mentioned that this is the only area in Ein el-Sultan he never visits. This area also counts with privileged infrastructure services like street lighting.

FIGURE 28: ZONE WITH A CONCENTRATION OF RETURNEES. SOURCE: TAKEN BY AUTHOR

Some mental maps indicate small zones of concentrations of new-arrival refugees from Gaza and zones of refugees in general mostly in the centre of the camp.

The author has noticed a concentration of holiday homes in the higher areas of the camp, as these locations are privileged with regards to the view over the Jordan valley and for climatic reasons. This spatial concentration could become stronger over time if the trend continues and more holiday homes are built in this area.

---

[55] E.g. the head of the local committee has his house there.

In conclusion it can be said that while larger parts of Ein el-Sultan are very mixed, some zones are fragmented and this circumstance is causing social conflict.

Segregation of Houses

One of the defining attributes of Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East is the dense urban structure. When looking over texts regarding refugee camps in this region, commonly used phrases are "*hyper-congested mass of multi-storey buildings*" (Niebel 2012), "*dense, overcrowded and hyper-urbanized*" (Budeiri 2012, S. 8) and "*among the most densely inhabited urban areas in the world*"[56] (UNRWA 2012, S. 20). While this is true for many camps in the region, it certainly is not in Ein el-Sultan. As described in the chapter on urban analysis (p.61), Ein el-Sultan has the lowest floor space index of all camps in the West Bank. This very low built density and the exceptionally low population density are manifested in the spatial typology of the camp.

There are only few multi-storey buildings in Ein el-Sultan, mainly on the main road. Most of the houses are one or two-storey structures with surrounding gardens (see UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem 2013b, S. 20). A dominant spatial feature in the camps is the wall surrounding a plot of land. It might be exaggerated to call each house out a little *gated community* but the sentiment of private spaces totally inaccessible and unnoticeable from the outside is persistent. This detached arrangement is reminiscent of

---

[56] Some Palestinian refugee camps can actually be considered as one of the densest settlements worldwide. E.g. Camp No. 1 in the West Bank hast 1.473 registered refugees per hectare. Comparable informal settlements in Sao Paolo tend to have around 500-700 people per hectare (UNRWA 2012, S. 21).

typical suburban structures and it is not surprising that some interviewees perceive Ein el-Sultan as a suburb.

The crowded living conditions and hence the lack of private spaces in many refugee camps in the region contribute to the rich urban life and extensive use of public space. The opposite is happening in Ein el-Sultan: detached houses and vast private gardens enable the residents to live a more private and fragmented life. The low density and building typology may contribute to the low street activity.

Political Disintegration

As described earlier (see page 31), the political sphere in Palestinian refugee camps is a defining element. The political discourse lies in the very core of camps and shapes social and spatial contexts. Camps are almost by definition political spaces. That is true internally as well as externally, where the question of refugee camps is one of the core issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

In terms of politics, refugee camps all over the West Bank are intensely connected. Ein el-Sultan seems to be an exception. Isshaq Barbary feels that "*they are absent politically*" (Kostenwein 18.07.2013). Political issues, like the question of normalisation or return have seldom appeared during the field work in the camp even though they are the core of Palestinian refugee camps self-perception. The lack of political discourse (in the sense of refugee-politics) is strongly manifested in the self-understanding of the camp residents (see below). One could search for explanation in the locality of the camp next to Jericho, a place that has been politically very passive during the both intifadas maybe also due to its isolated location and relatively early status as area A. However, Aqbat Jabr, the neighbouring

camp, is politically very active in the discourse of Palestinian refugees than and the political parties there are stronger than in Ein el-Sultan, where they appear to deal more with issues of internal administration than with external politics (the electricity conflict described earlier is an exception[57]). "*Ein el-Sultan is politically less conscious*" says Sandi Hilal, there is "*a lack of political and social leadership and the residents are apolitical*" (Kostenwein 25.07.2014).

Normalised Identity

The identity as a refugee, especially in a refugee camp, is meaningful and symbolic. The symbolic meaning of living in a temporary space, waiting for return is so strong that UNRWA sometimes finds it hard to implement strategies to improve the urban environment because this is seen as normalisation and a threat to the refugee status (see UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 29). A camp therefore cannot ever be normalised and become a city but must officially stay a temporary space. Alessandro Petti and Sandi Hilal write about Fawwar camp in the West Bank: "*The precariousness and temporariness of the camp structure was not simply a technical problem, but also the material-symbolic embodiment of the principle that its inhabitants be allowed to return as soon as possible to their place of origin*" (2013, S. 1). The notion and political self-understanding of camps as exceptional temporary spaces is so strong that some refugees deliberately choose not to improve their living conditions and any upgrading within camps is a controversial matter.

Once again, Ein el-Sultan is an exception within the exception of Palestinian refugee camps. Here, many residents, refugees or returnees, do not have a political problem with the idea of being or becoming a city. In the opposite, it seems to be a desire or the aim of many to be seen at as a city rather than a camp. Some refugees state that Ein el-Sultan is already a city and some see it turning into a city sooner or later: "In 20 years we will be a city". Others call it a "neighbourhood" or a "suburb of Jericho". Only two interviewees (one returnee and a new-arrival from Jerusalem) expressed their feeling that Ein el-Sultan is actually a camp.

The identity of the Palestinian refugee camps, which is usually something residents are proud of, has a more negative connotation in Ein el-Sultan. That is true especially for returnees, who are by definition not refugees. One returnee says that "we are no camp, because we are not all from here, we are mixed".

---

[57] See page 68.

But also refugees connect negative attributes to camps. A *refugee camp* is often seen as a place that is "overcrowded", "unorganised" and full of "troublemakers" and "social conflicts". The self-perception of many residents is that Ein el-Sultan is something "better than a typical camp"; a place where people "respect each other". Very often interviewees mentioned the quiet nature of Ein el-Sultan as an attribute that makes it a better place to live than most other camps: "Here it is quiet and relaxed in opposition to other camps". One new-arrival refugee tells the story of his visit to the nearby refugee camp, Aqbat Jabr, where he witnessed loud shouting and discussions on the street[58]. He feels that this would not happen in Ein el-Sultan as this is "a quiet and respectful place", "cleaner and better than Aqbat Jabr" and that here "social relations are different".

One interviewee mentions that refugees and refugee camps are being marginalised by Palestinian non-refugees from Jericho, which is a common phenomenon in the West Bank. It seems that many residents want to avoid the notion of living in a refugee camp and even feel ashamed. They emphasize the fact that Ein el-Sultan is a part of Jericho rather than a camp. One interviewee states that Ein el-Sultan is called "New Jericho". Another one mentions that the only division between Jericho and Ein el-Sultan is the main road. In that sense it is interesting that Ein el-Sultan does not have a gate or monument at the camp entrance, stating the name of the camp as many other camps in the West Bank, including Aqbat Jabr.

The spatial structure of Ein el-Sultan is often referred to as one of the reason why Ein el-Sultan is not a typical camp or not a camp at all. One refugee compares the spatial configuration of Ein el-Sultan to Jericho unlike other Palestinian refugee camps. Another refuge argues that the abundance of "big spaces and gardens" is responsible for the quietness. One returnee remembers that he has visited other refugee camps which were crowded and unorganised. Therefore Ein el-Sultan "is not a camp".

INTERRELATIONS OF CATEGORIES

The research questions of this thesis are focussing on the relations of the categories describes above. The research process has unveiled manifold interconnections, some stronger and clearer, some more diffuse and hidden. The following section is presenting these connections one by one. The category *spatial* fragmentation for this purpose is represented by its two subcategories, *fragmented neighbourhoods* and *segregated houses*.

---

[58] Stereotypes a feeling of superiority between refugee camps in the West Bank are a common phenomenon.

The interrelations between the lack of political discourse or the normalised identity and the social fragmentation are subtle but thorough. On the one hand, the social structure in the camp may have a durable influence on the political absence of Ein el-Sultan. As one returnee stated, the lack of camp identity might be rooted in the heterogeneous social structure of the camp, which is a unique feature of Ein el-Sultan. Another reason for a weak political discourse might be the dominance of returnees who have a strong connection to the PNA. The PNA has the connotation of trying to avoid a strong refugee related political discourse as they perceive it as a political threat to their government and prospects for the formation of a Palestinian state[59] (see Kostenwein 18.07.2013). It is remarkable, and raises a lot of political questions, that PNA returnees have moved to a refugee camp, while camps are "*invisible, unspoken, and unthinkable for the Oslo process*" , that created the PNA in the first place (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 281). So maybe, the discourse in Ein el-Sultan is rather oppressed or hidden rather than inexistent, due to the influence of the PNA agenda.

Also the fact that there is a large portion of refugees with Bedouin background could have a weakening influence on refugee identity. The Bedouin identity and community structures are strong and might override or dominate the refugee identity in the community.

On the other side, there are indicators for a catalysing influence of the political disintegration on the social divide. Paradoxically, it might be the weak political self-understanding of Ein el-Sultan that allowed its particular demographic structure of today. Sandi Hilal argues that most camps would not have accepted the influx of the "political enemy" (the PNA) in their camps after the Oslo accords in 1993 (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). Aqbat Jabr for example had similarly vast empty spaces but today does not host such a large portion of returnees if it does at all[60]. In that sense, the apolitical personality of Ein el-Sultan made it possible for the returnees to become such a large milieu in the camp in the first place. The apolitical character of Ein el-Sultan became even weaker due to the presence of the returnees with a different political agenda.

---

[59] Sandi Hilal argues that the mere existence of the PNA is a denial of the right to return for Palestinian refugees as the institution was founded through the Oslo agreements. By accepting it, the PNA also acknowledges the 1967 borders which is seen as a major threat to the right to return by refugees (Kostenwein 25.07.2014).
[60] There is no data on Aqbat Jabr that indicates the presence of returnees. Nevertheless, further investigation is needed. Until then, this statement can be seen as an assumption.

Political Disintegration and Reciprocal Marginalisation

The weak political leadership within the camp and the lack of a political vision that aims at political goals outside the camp might amplify the social phenomena, like the perceived marginalisation within the camp. Usually, camps have common political struggles with big political actors, like the PNA, non-refugees or UNRWA. Camp refugees often feel collectively marginalised by these external stakeholders. This is not so much the case in Ein el-Sultan where this energy of conflict is steered to internal actors.

A strong social or political leadership could also act as a uniting element, strengthening the identity of the community and therefore undermining the social divide.

Political Disintegration and Community Engagement

Community organisations and cultural or social activities in Palestinian refugee camps are most of the time strongly linked to the political discourse. Many NGOs in camps are very political and children are from early on confronted with the political discourse through community organisations. The low number of NGOs might be a result of the apolitical character of Ein el-Sultan, as the motivation of political engagement is lacking. At the same time, the lack of social leadership, which often is taking the form of NGOs, could support the political identity of a community. Social leadership in Ein el-Sultan is relatively weak, which marks a possible contribution to the apolitical character.

Political Disintegration and Non-Social, Non-Political Public Space

The link between political disintegration and community engagement has been described before. In that sense there is a clear but indirect link to the non-social character of public space in Ein el-Sultan as the low level of NGOs and CBOs decreases the use of public space during social and cultural events. But the lack of a political discourse also directly effects public space. The lack of a strong political identity prevents public space from becoming a political space with political graffiti, posters or protests and political events as it is happening in other Palestinian refugee camps.

On the other hand, the lack of street life and the specific *camp feeling* that seems to intrinsic to other Palestinian refugee camps also undermines any refugee camp identity in Ein el-Sultan (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). Some interviewees voiced their feeling that Ein el-Sultan is not actually a camp due to its quiet character also in public space. The fact that social activities

are concentrated to private spaces might be an obstacle for a strong camp identity.

Political Disintegration and Segregated Houses

The link of spatial structures as a factor for camp identity can be doubted as camps have different spatial configurations but similar political visions. As is the case of Ein el-Sultan and Aqbat Jabr, camps sometimes have similar spatial attributes but very different political characteristics. There are distinct physical appearances within Palestinian refugee camps and some blend in with their neighbourhoods , but "*the dense core of the camp remains a recognisable feature*" (UNRWA 2012, S. 20). For many interviewees, the fact that Ein el-Sultan does not have this *dense recognisable feature* is one of the reasons why they do not perceive it as a camp. Because the camp is not overcrowded and messy, it is not seen as a camp by its own residents. In that sense, the spatial structure does play an important role in the political disintegration of Ein el-Sultan.

Social Fragmentation and Reciprocal Marginalisation

When one understands the category of social fragmentation as the specific fragmented social structure in Ein el-Sultan that is made up of distinctive milieus with different cultural, historical and political backgrounds, then there is a clear and obvious connection to the reciprocal feeling of marginalisation that is so present in Ein el-Sultan. The clear social divide is the basis for these feelings of marginalisation, as it is able to create a notion of *us* and *them* within the camp. Usually in other Palestinian refugee camps the *us* refers to most of the camp residents, as the population is rather homogenous and the *them* are more external actors.

Social Fragmentation and Fragmented Neighbourhoods

The social structure and the demographic history created large parts of the spatial fragmentation within Ein el-Sultan. The fact that returnees settled closely inside Ein el-Sultan created a concentration of a certain milieu that until today creates social conflict. Later, milieus from Gaza and Jerusalemites also tended to settle close to each other. In that sense, the social structure of Ein el-Sultan manifested itself in space and created a light form of spatial fragmentation.

Reciprocal Marginalisation and Community Engagement

The relation between the perceived reciprocal marginalisation and the weak community engagement is a mutual one. On the one hand, the social divide has an influence on social and cultural collective activities, as there are little NGOs that represent the whole camp community. In fact, the few NGOs in the camp seem to be dominated by the milieu of refugees, which increases the sentiment of marginalisation among other milieus like returnees who sometimes do not feel welcome. NGOs often act as uniting elements within camp communities and create a sense of identity. The lack of NGOs and community engagement in Ein el-Sultan increases the sense of the *other* and decreases opportunities for meeting and communicating among the different milieus in Ein el-Sultan.

Reciprocal Marginalisation and Fragmentation Neighbourhoods

The fact that the milieu of returnees have settled in a concentrated way along the main road, a privileged location with relatively high economic potential, creates a feeling of marginalisation among the other milieus in the camp who feel, that the returnees have stolen this valuable land. Hence, the specific form of spatial fragmentation does create a perception of marginalisation in Ein el-Sultan.

Community Engagement and Non-Social, Non-Political Public Space

The lack of community engagement is also manifested in the lack of street activity. Whereas in many other Palestinian refugee camps, cultural or social events often take place in public space and therefore are a catalyst for street life, Ein el-Sultan mostly lacks these kinds of activities. The existing NGOs, like the Women Programme Centre are located in compounds and activities are taking place behind walls and not in public space.

Segregated Houses and Non-Social, Non-Political Public Space

The specific urban structure with its detached houses surrounded by large private gardens and divided by walls are creating underused and abandoned public spaces. The abundance of blind walls does generate a feeling of insecurity as there are no eyes on the street and a sense that streets are to be used solely for circulation. Social activities often take place inside private gardens, where shade and vegetation is available.

CONCLUSIONS

This section is answering the research questions one by one. In addition, it presents two findings that appeared during the research process that mark a contribution to the discourse on Palestinian refugee camps.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

QUESTION 1: WHAT ARE THE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL AND SPATIAL FRAGMENTATION IN EIN EL-SULTAN REFUGEE CAMP?

The grounded theory approach has revealed multiple connections between the social structure and the spatial and social fragmentation. It has to be said that the research has found definitive causal relations. E.g. throughout the research it was not possible to determine whether the social fragmentation was the result of the social structure and the spatial configuration or the other way around.

Nevertheless, the analysis showed strong interrelations and influences between these categories. The spatial fragmentation of houses and neighbourhoods does have an influence on the social fragmentation. There is a clear link between the spatial structure of detached houses with private

gardens and the lack of social activities in public space. The abundance of private spaces and walls undermines neighbourhood relations. Fragmented neighbourhoods in Ein el-Sultan are partly responsible for the social divide and reciprocal perceived marginalisation. The lack of community engagement has a mutual relation with the underused public space of the camp. The strong feeling of marginalisation among most milieus in Ein el-Sultan is also rooted in the absence of spaces of social encounters which is highly related to spatial fragmentation. The special social structure provides the basis for the social divide, as milieus of different political, social and cultural backgrounds fail to create a sense of collectivity and belonging.

QUESTION 2: ARE THERE DYNAMICS OF SPATIAL EXPULSION IN EIN EL-SULTAN AND ARE THEY LINKED TO THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE?

The question whether residents of Ein el-Sultan are suffering from spatial expulsion due to the influx of wealthier holidaymakers from Jerusalem and other places in the West Bank and beyond, was answered quite early in the research process. While the analysis of the demographic change and the land prices in the camp and the region shows that there is growing pressure on the land market, there are no indicators that there are dynamics of expulsion. The abundance of space and the opportunity to expand houses horizontally in the vast gardens of vertically are large enough to accommodate this pressure.

However, that does not mean that the high prices of land and the increase of holiday houses are not problematic for camp residents and governance in Ein el-Sultan. There were some complaints among camp residents about land prices and the mostly empty holiday houses surely do not contribute much to camp life. UNRWA and other actors involved in governance are facing big challenges in dealing with the new temporary residents of Ein el-Sultan.

Nonetheless there is no evidence of camp dwellers having to leave or let go of their houses and nobody seems to be faced with obstacles when trying to find land for construction within the camp borders. This might change in a couple of years if this trend continues and it is important to keep the danger of spatial expulsion in mind to prevent any future problems.

QUESTION 3: IS THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND THE COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN EIN EL-SULTAN DIFFERENT FROM OTHER PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND WHAT ARE INFLUENCING FACTORS?

This research question has unveiled surprising results and created further questions, which are discussed below. The political discourse is very

different to other Palestinian Refugee Camps in the West Bank. Some camps in the region have stronger political voices than others but generally, camp communities are involved in the political struggle of refugees (Kostenwein 25.07.2014). Ein el-Sultan marks a complete exception in this context, as it is absent in the political dialogue among camps in the West Bank and many camp residents from all milieus are apolitical in that manner. The political parties in Ein el-Sultan "*are more concerned with daily life*" and administrational issues (Kostenwein 25.07.2014) than with external political matters.

The identity of the camp residents differs immensely from other Palestinian refugee camps as Ein el-Sultan is not considered as a camp but a district of Jericho or a city by many camp residents. Both, refugees and returnees share these views, which would be unthinkable in other camps as giving up the camp character is undermining the refugee struggle for return.

Ein el-Sultan does have a community identity, but it is more based on a feeling of superiority towards other camps and can be understood as an identity more linked to Jericho than to the political status of refugees.

There are diverse influences and interrelations with the exceptional identity and the lack of political discourse of Ein el-Sultan. The social structure is a strong factor, starting with the uniquely heterogeneous camp population and its political consequences. Also the strong presence of PNA returnees with their own political discourse which is very different from the one of refugees has an influence on the discourse in the camp. On the other hand, the apolitical nature of Ein el-Sultan allowed the returnees to settle in the first place.

Another factor is the dominant Bedouin culture, which could deteriorate the refugee identity. There is a weak political and social leadership in the camp, which contributes to the reciprocal perceived marginalisation among the different milieus. This social divide on the other side also undermines a collective political discourse. Whether the little number of NBOs and the lack of community engagement in general is a result of, or a reason for the low political interaction, is uncertain, but the relation is clearly there.

The fact that public space does not serve as a social space that provides opportunities of political encounter and political expression might be influenced by the lack of political discourse but at the same time supports the apolitical character of Ein el-Sultan.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DISCOURSE ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS

The research process exposed unexpected findings that led to fundamental questions beyond the original research questions but still within the focus of the investigation. It is due to the importance of these questions and also due to the openness of the grounded theory process, that these finding are included in this thesis. They will be presented and discussed briefly and can be seen as new contributions to the complex discourse on Palestinian refugee camps. These issues tackle major challenges of governance especially for UNRWA and help in finding future strategies in dealing with them.

Is Ein el-Sultan normalised?

The awareness of the process of normalisation (Arabic: ta´tbih) is a defining aspect of Palestinian refugee camps. The rationale behind the fight against normalisation, in the case of Palestinian refugee camps, is the belief of many refugees living in camps "*that it is important to perpetuate the camps' appearance as temporary, make-shift, and seemingly chaotic places, and that this is connected to ensuring the Right of Return*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 227). It is a strongly political cause that makes working for improving the living conditions in the camps very complicated (see page 32). This goes so far that camp residents often refuse to improve houses, infrastructure and public space.

In Ein el-Sultan, the improvement of houses and private gardens is an ongoing process. Though similar improvement processes can be found in other refugee camps as well, indicating a pragmatic approach to the normalisation discourse among the refugee community. Nevertheless, most refugee camps in the West Bank are still preserving their unique exceptional character and holding on to certain symbolic temporalities, like the absence of street lights. Ein el-Sultan certainly blends into its surrounding area and many distinctive elements of Palestinian refugee camps that are marking the precarious status of camps are missing.

At the same time, the fight against normalisation is also and maybe even more a symbolic one. Refugees often fear that normalisation would "*weaken the camp's symbolic status, or worse, lead to the loss of possible compensation or future re-claiming of ancestral properties*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 227). This is why the refugee identity is so important and why in many camps, the entrances to camps are made highly visible with symbolic gates. This is also why it is very clear for most camp residents in the West Bank that they are living in a camp, even if the camp is completely integrated in the surrounding municipalities. In Fawwar camp,

the community once articulated the "*fear that refugees would be forced to normalise as municipalities, thereby trading in their Right of Return*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 238).

Most residents of the analysed milieus in Ein el-Sultan do not insist on Ein el-Sultan´s status as a temporary exceptional space. In the opposite, many interviewees argue that Ein el-Sultan is a normal part of Jericho, or soon will be. In this sense, it is not surprising that Ein el-Sultan does not have a symbolic gate at the camps entrances. Sandi Hilal argues that the fact that Ein el-Sultan is so apolitical results in the acceptance of normalisation per se (Kostenwein 2012/2013). Some interviewees are proud of Ein el-Sultan´s quiet and organised character, in their view so untypical for camps. The symbolic value of the temporary status of a camp is not such an important issue as in other Palestinian refugee camps and the comfortable feeling that is opposing the temporary status of refugee camps is dominant.

The symbolic meaning of being uncomfortable is important for the concept of non-normalisation [61]. In Ein el-Sultan, many residents are very comfortable and do not have any problem in talking about it. One new-arrival refugee states that "it is hard to move away from here [Ein el-Sultan] because it is so quiet end relaxing". Another returnee states that he belongs to Jericho when he talks about the option of living somewhere else. A resident of Dheheishe refugee camp, located right next to Bethlehem, would never refer to himself as living in Bethlehem but as a refugee from Dheheishe. This supports the impression that there is a strong sense of identity among many residents. But surprisingly that is not an identity linked to the status as a refugee camp but to the fact that Ein el-Sultan is already normalised, just another neighbourhood in Jericho, different from the crowded and loud refugee camps in the rest of the region.

Another important factor in the question of normalisation is the role of UNRWA as a service provider and as a guarantee for the temporary status of refugee camps. In Ein el-Sultan, some residents complained about the decrease of services of URNWA. This seemed to be more due to practical rather than political or symbolical reasons. In Ein el-Sultan, the issue of normalisation was hardly ever mentioned by the community throughout the Camp Improvement process – in stark contrast to many other similar processes in other camps.

In conclusion, Ein el-Sultan is almost normalised, only the presence of UNRWA keeps it from being so, as the role it plays in the camp is still seen as essential. Nevertheless, the self-understanding of the camp and the absence

---

[61] The rationale behind the notion of discomfort is that refugees do not want to become comfortable in a place that is not theirs. It is conserving the refugee spirit and meant as a reminder of the temporary nature of their stay and the awaited return back to their original lands.

of the open struggle of normalisation itself indicates, that it is to a certain extent normalised. The open comfortable attitude of many residents suggests, that also symbolically Ein el-Sultan is normalised, or at least the most normalised Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank today. In that sense, Ein el-Sultan can serve as a unique case study for both, the refugee community opposing normalisation and those actors in favour of normalising camps.

Is Ein el-Sultan a refugee camp?

Sandi Hilal argues that the constant struggle against normalisation is the only reason why Palestinian refugee camps after 60 years are still refugee camps (Kostenwein 2012/2013). The fact that this struggle is more or less absent in Ein el-Sultan and that the camp is to a certain extent normalised, poses a much more fundamental question: Is Ein el-Sultan still a refugee camp?

To answer this question, one has to come back to the definitions of refugee camps and acknowledge that there is a variety of very different definitions that lead to very dissimilar answers to this complicated question.

The most basic definition of a refugee camps refer to grouped temporary shelters built to host refugees. Ein el-Sultan does fulfil parts of such definition. Legally, Ein el-Sultan is still temporary and refugees live in the camp (besides many non-refugees). The question if Ein el-Sultan after more than 60 years of existence and with no strong emphasis on the right to return among the camp community can still be considered temporary is debatable. The often voiced wish to become a suburb of Jericho suggests a more permanent self-understanding. The high amount of non-refugees living within the camps borders also challenges this definition.

A more relevant definition of what a Palestinian refugee camp is, comes from UNRWA: "*A Palestine refugee camp is defined as a plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to cater to their needs. Areas not designated as such and are not recognized as camps. […]*

The plots of land on which the recognized camps were set up are either state land or, in most cases, land leased by the host government from local landowners. This means that the refugees in camps do not 'own' the land on which their shelters were built, but have the right to 'use' the land for a residence" (UNRWA 2014).

For humanitarian organisations, like UNRWA, managing camps means managing crisis and sheltering refugees in need of shelter. In this sense, Ein el-Sultan is a refugee camp as it officially fulfils UNRWAs criteria for a refugee camp. The land of Ein el-Sultan is leased by UNRWA from mostly

private owners and UNRWA provides services to refugees (and non-refugees) living in the camp.

Then there is the more political and symbolical definition of a refugee camp. Manuel Herz writes: "*Space becomes a medium for politics. Refugee camps are probably the most direct translation of politics into space. Any political strategy or decision has immediate consequence on a spatial dimension in the camp. And any spatial modification, at whatever scale, immediately resonates on a political and demographic level. The camp is an instance of politics directly translated into space*" (2012).

This is especially true for Palestinian refugee camps, as they are "*are firmly built into the national struggle against the Israeli occupation and are valued as human reminders of historical injustice and the abuse of human rights. The camps played a crucial role during the two intifadas and regularly serve as visible symbols of the Palestinian struggle*" (UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart 2005, S. 281).

Sandi Hilal argues that camps are the political reclamation of space and the physical manifestation of the right to return: "*A camp is a camp for political reasons*" (Kostenwein 2012/2013).

Ein el-Sultan does not fit into this politically determined definition. It is not strongly seen as a political representation of the political struggle of the Palestinian refugees by the camp residents.

In conclusion, it can be said that Ein el-Sultan is a refugee camp and at the same time it is not a refugee camp. It fulfils official criteria of UNRWA and refugees are sheltered but it does not live up to the political definition in the discourse of Palestinian refugee camps.

On the one hand, Ein el-Sultan resembles a perfect scenario of a Palestinian refugee camp for some actors, including UNRWA. It is an *easy* camp to work with, Sandi Hilal calls it the "*favourite camp of UNRWA*" (Kostenwein 2012/2013).The definition of refugee camps as recipients of relief and aid does still suit Ein el-Sultan, which seems to have accepted this notion. It even acted as a refuge for the PNA returnees in an act of hospitality that would not be possible in many other camps. This lack of opposition and strong political voice that makes working in the camp so easy for UNRWA and that allowed the intake of the returnees, at the same time questions the status of a refugee camp of Ein el-Sultan when analysed with the political discourse in Palestinian refugee camps in mind.

In that sense, Ein el-Sultan is a refugee camp only because UNRWA is holding on to it. Because of the definition of UNRWA, Ein el-Sultan is legally a camp and because UNRWA is there, servicing the community and being the defining actor, there is a clear difference to the rest of Jericho that is not

administered by UNRWA. The question that arises is: Would Ein el-Sultan stop being a refugee camp if UNRWA decided to withdraw? Would Ein el-Sultan seek to become a regular part of Jericho or would it hold on to being a refugee camp with all its political implication? The results of this research imply that Ein el-Sultan would quickly choose to be a part of Jericho.

These findings mark a big challenge for future governance in Ein el-Sultan. What if the trend continues and in a few years, the majority of the camps residents are non-refugees? Would UNRWA still service the whole camp? If UNRWA decides to withdraw, even partly, the status of Ein el-Sultan as a Palestinian refugee camp would also officially dissolve.

REFERENCES

Agier, Michel: Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects. (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government). In: *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 2010 (1), S. 22–45.

Agier, Michel (2002): Between War and City. Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee Camps. In: *Ethnography* 3 (317), S. 316–341.

Agier, Michel (2011): From Refuge the Ghetto is born. Contemporary Figures of Heterotopias. Cambridge.

Al-Awadat, Hussein (1990): Mawsua't al-mudon al-filastiniyah [Encyclopaedia of the Palestinian Cities]. Beirut.

Altheit, Peter (Göttingen): Grounded Theory. Ein alternativer methodologischer Rahmen für qualitative Forschungsprozesse. LVA Text, Grundstudium Pädagogik (1999).

Altheit, Peter (1999): Grounded Theory. Ein alternativer methodologischer Rahmen für qualitative Forschungsprozesse1. Göttingen.

Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) (2012): Ein as Sultan Camp Profile. Jerusalem. Online verfügbar unter vprofile.arij.org.

Budeiri, Muna (2012): On Camp Improvement. In: UNRWA (Hg.): Space, Time, Dignity, Rights,. Improving Palestinian Refugee Camps. Exhibition Catalogue. Amman, S. 8–11.

Campus in Camps: The Campus in Camps Book. Online verfügbar unter http://www.campusincamps.ps/en/about/, zuletzt geprüft am 25,10,2014.

Dangschat, Jens (2007): Lebensstile, soziale Lagen und Siedlungsstrukturen. Hannover.

Dias, Amanda S A (2013): At the Margins of the City and the State. A Comparative Approach between. Berlin.

Dilger, Martin (200): Grounded Theory. Ein Überblick über ihre charakteristischen Merkmale. Berlin.

Directorate of Agriculture in Jericho (2010/2011): Data on Agriculture in Jericho. Jericho.

Ehmayer, Cornelia (2014): Aktivierende Stadtdiagnose. STADTPSYCHOLOGIE. Online verfügbar unter http://www.stadtpsychologie.at/aktivierende-stadtdiagnose, zuletzt geprüft am 22.10.2014.

Fasttimesinpalestine (2014): Maps of Israel, Palestine, the Wall, and Settlements. Online verfügbar unter https://fasttimesinpalestine.wordpress.com/2009/10/13/maps-of-israel-palestine/, zuletzt aktualisiert am 25.10.2014.

Feldman, Ilana (2013): Aid Effects. Palestine Refugee reflections on humanitarian sociality, responsibility and identity. Unpublished.

Fleischer, Stella (2008): Schicht, Milieu oder Lebensstil? Konzepte zur Analyse sozialer Ungleichheit.

Gally, Julia (2009): Vom Klassen- Beziehungsweise Schichtmodell Zum Milieukonzept. Erlangen.

Hanafi, Sari (2010): Governing Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Arab East: Governmentalities in Search of Legitimacy. Beirut.

Häußermann, Hartmut; Siebel, Walter (2001): Integration und Segregation – Überlegungen zu einer alten Debatte. In: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kommunalwissenschaften (DfK), Heft 1, 2001* 1, S. 68–79.

Hertzsch, Wencke (2014): Sozialraumanalyse in der Planung. Online verfügbar unter http://www.partizipation.at/fileadmin/media_data/Downloads/themen/sozialraum_1.pdf, zuletzt geprüft am 22.10.2014.

Herz, Manuel (2012): Ideal Cities in Dust and Durt. Basel. Online verfügbar unter www.manuelheru.com/ideal-cities-in-dust-and-dirt, zuletzt geprüft am 14.10.2014.

Hofinger, Karl F. (2014): Sozialraum und Sozialraumanalyse. Online verfügbar unter http://www.partizipation.at/fileadmin/media_data/Downloads/themen/sozialraum_1.pdf, zuletzt geprüft am 24.10.2014.

Hradil, Stefan (2006): Soziale Milieus. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Online verfügbar unter http://www.bpb.de/apuz/29429/soziale-milieus-eine-praxisorientierte-forschungsperspektive?p=all, zuletzt geprüft am 22.10.2014.

Jones: Michael; Alony, Irit: Guiding the Use of Grounded Theory in Doctoral Studies. An Example from the Australian Film Industry. In: *International Journal of Doctoral Studies* 2011 (6), S. 95–114.

Kitzinger, Jenny (1995): Qualitative Research: Introducing focus groups. BMJ. Online verfügbar unter http://www.bmj.com/content/311/7000/299, zuletzt geprüft am 22.10.2014.

Kostenwein, David (2012/2013): Refugee Camps in the West Bank. Interview mit Sandi Hilal. Bethlehem.

Kostenwein, David (11.03.2013): Ein el-Sultan Refugee Camp. Interview mit Sami Murra. Bethlehem.

Kostenwein, David (18.07.2013): Ein el-Sultan. Interview mit Isshaq Barbary. Ilheus, Brasil.

Kostenwein, David (July 2014): Palestinian Refugee Camps in the West Bank. Interview mit Ahmad Lahham. Ilheus, Brasil.

Kostenwein, David (25.07.2014): Ein el-Sultan. Interview mit Sandi Hilal. Ilheus, Brasil.

Läpple, Dieter (Hg.) (1991): Stadt und Raum – stadtsoziologische Analysen. Unter Mitarbeit von H. Häußermann, D. Ipsen, T. Krämer-Badoni, D. Läpple, M. Rodenstein und W. Siebel. Pfaffenweiler.

Lees, Loretta (2000): A Reappraisal of Gentrification. Towards a Geography of Genrification. In: *Progress in Human Geography 24,3 (2000) pp. 389–408* 2, S. 389–408.

Legewie, Heiner (2009): Workshop Akteursanalyse. Berliner Methodentreffen. Online verfügbar unter http://www.qualitative-forschung.de/methodentreffen/angebot/ws/2009.html, zuletzt geprüft am 22.10.2014.

Löw, Martina (2001): Raumsoziologie. Frankfurt am Main.

Misselwitz, Philipp (2012): Space, Time, Dignity, Rights. Improving Palestine Refugee Camps. Exhibition Catalogue. Amman.

Misselwitz, Philipp; Hanafi, Sari (2009): Testing a New Paradigm: UNRWA's Camp Improvement Programme. In: *Refugee Survey Quarterly. Number 2-3/2009* 2, S. 360–388.

Niebel, Dirk (2012): Foreword. In: UNRWA (Hg.): Space, Time, Dignity, Rights,. Improving Palestinian Refugee Camps. Exhibition Catalogue. Amman, S. 4.

Odeh Kassis, Rifat (2011): What does 'Normalisation' mean in the Palestine-Israel Conflict? Hg. v. Kairos Southern Africa. Kairo. Online verfügbar unter http://kairossouthernafrica.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/what-does-normalisation-mean-in-the-palestine-israel-conflict/, zuletzt geprüft am 18.10.2014.

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2009): General Census of Population and Housing 2007. Ramallah, 2009.

Petti, Alessandro; Hilal, Sandi (2013): Beyond the Public. A Common Space in Fawaar Refugee Camp.

Ruge, Wolfgang (2009): Grounded Theory. Magdeburg.

Sanjines, Daniela (2013): Incremental stories. Comparison of Informal Development Processes in Palestinian. Barcelona.

Strauss, Anselm (2004): Methodologische Grundlagen der Grounded Theory. In: Jörg Strübing und Bernt Schnettler (Hg.): Methodologie interpretativer Sozialforschung: Klassische Grundlagentexte. Konstanz, S. 429–451.

Strauss, Anseml; Corbin. J (1998): Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. Second Edition. London.

Sturm, Gabriele (Hg.) (2000): Wege zum Raum. Methodologische Annäherungen an ein Basiskonzept raumbezogener Wissenschaften. Opladen.

Taleb, Adwan (1999): Refugee Camp Lands: Political/Juridical Issues and Social Practices in the. unpublished. Dead Sea.

Taleb, Adwan (2005): Real Estate Sector inside the Refugee Camps in West Bank. In: UNRWA und SIAAL University of Stuttgart (Hg.): Camp Development Pilot Research Project- Phase 1. Palestine, S. R5.

UNHCR (2014): Figures at a Glance. UNHCR. Online verfügbar unter http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html, zuletzt aktualisiert am 20.10.2014.

UNRWA (Hg.) (2012): Space, Time, Dignity, Rights,. Improving Palestinian Refugee Camps. Exhibition Catalogue. UNRWA. Amman.

UNRWA (2014): PALESTINE REFUGEES. Online verfügbar unter http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees, zuletzt aktualisiert am 14.10.2014.

UNRWA; SIAAL University of Stuttgart (Hg.) (2005): Camp Development Pilot Research Project-Phase 1. Palestine.

UNRWA ICIP (2008): Camp Improvement Manual. Amman.

UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem (2012a): Focus Group Meeting, Mixed. Bethlehem, 17.06.2012.

UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem (2012b): Thematic Workshop. Topic: Infrastructure. Bethlehem, 13.09.2012.

UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem (2013a): Ein el-Sultan Action Plan. Bethlehem.

UNRWA ICIP Bethlehem (2013b): Ein el-Sultan Camp Improvement PLan. Bethlehem.

Willig, Carla (2013): Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology. London.

ANNEX

Mental Maps

Code: 4
Male/Female

Age: 26

Refugee/Non-Refugee/PA-Returnee/New-Arrival

Code: 2
Male/Female

Age: 29

Refugee/Non-Refugee/PA-Returnee/New-Arrival