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Titel
Modeling favoritism with an imperfect information repeated game / von György Kozics
VerfasserKozics, György
Begutachter / BegutachterinRitzberger, Klaus
Erschienen2015
UmfangIV, 19 Bl.
HochschulschriftWien, Techn. Univ. u. IHS, Master-Arb., 2015
SpracheEnglisch
DokumenttypMasterarbeit
Schlagwörter (EN)Favoritism / repeated game / imperfect information / Folk theorem
URNurn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:1-80609 Persistent Identifier (URN)
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Modeling favoritism with an imperfect information repeated game [0.3 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

We model favoritism with an imperfect monitoring infinitely repeated game. We find that favoritism is driven by players trading favors over time. We show that favoritism is harder to maintain in larger groups, group mem- bers increase their payoff at the expense of others, and favoritism is easier to sustain in imperfect monitoring case compared to perfect monitoring. We also prove that for our game the Folk theorem does not hold if the number of players is 4, and we impose a restriction to the parameters.