Director's dealings in Germany and their consequences for the firm value / von Marcus Presich
Verfasser / Verfasserin Presich, Marcus
Begutachter / BegutachterinAussenegg, Wolfgang
Umfang80 Bl. : Ill., graph. Darst.
HochschulschriftWien, Techn. Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2014
Literaturverz. S. 74 - 80
Schlagwörter (DE)Management-Transaktion / Insider Handel / Deutschland / Firmenwert / Event Studie / Markt Modell / BaFin
Schlagwörter (EN)Management transaction / Insider trading / Germany / firm value / Event study / market model / BaFin
URNurn:nbn:at:at-ubtuw:1-74049 Persistent Identifier (URN)
 Das Werk ist frei verfügbar
Director's dealings in Germany and their consequences for the firm value [1.06 mb]
Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

This thesis examines directors' dealings transactions in Germany. The sample includes over 3,612 events which were reported to the German financial authority BaFin from January 2002 until August 2013. Since the release of the European Market Abuse Directive there is a regulatory framework for doing such transactions. When managers are buying and selling their own companies' stocks they reveal information about their companies' values to the public. In fact, they often take the contrarian role to investors. This position is often based on the fact of information asymmetry and often managers or investors may earn excess returns. This abnormality is clearly a violation of the strong form efficient market hypothesis. Through this study an important hypothesis will be tested, for purchase and sale transactions. The results for the first category show that directors act as contrarian investors and usually trade against the general market wisdom. Indeed, other studies suggest similar results.

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